

2025

PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

ANALYTICAL NOTE

COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT
OF ELECTORAL PLATFORMS

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Since its establishment in 2000, ADEPT has been at the forefront of initiatives aimed at enhancing good governance, ensuring electoral integrity, and fostering civic participation through research, advocacy, and public outreach. Since 2018, ADEPT has served as the Secretariat of the Coalition for Free and Fair Elections (CALC), a platform uniting civil society organizations to uphold transparency, inclusiveness, and integrity in electoral processes in the Republic of Moldova.



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1. INTRODUCTION

The parliamentary elections scheduled for 28 September 2025 are taking place within an exceptionally complex regional and internal context.

The war in Ukraine continues to profoundly affect the entire region, with the Republic of Moldova continuously experiencing pressure from this situation, including security incidents at the border and recurring challenges concerning the safety of its airspace.

This tense backdrop coincides with an increasingly polarized society and political class, where geopolitical debates between pro-European and pro-Russian orientations intertwine with public dissatisfaction regarding the economic situation and the quality of governance.

The stakes of these elections are high. The future Parliament will be responsible for adopting the essential legislation required for European Union accession and for determining the country's overall strategic direction, which could either consolidate the rule of law and European integration or result in a shift toward closer ties with Russia.

The electoral competition is fierce, with 22 candidates remaining in the race, and most post-election scenarios forecast difficulties in forming a stable parliamentary majority following the vote.

This unstable context is further compounded by the hybrid war waged by Russia against Moldova, which manifests not only through propaganda and disinformation campaigns but also through attempts to directly manipulate the electorate, corrupt voters, engage in sabotage, and other forms of interference intended to derail the country's European trajectory.

Such tactics increase public distrust and make the electoral process even more vulnerable.

The presence of a large number of electoral competitors is a common feature of elections in the Republic of Moldova.

However, this abundance of options does not automatically translate into genuine pluralism for citizens, particularly given the general lack of understanding regarding the content of the electoral programs proposed by the candidates.

In most cases, voting preferences are shaped more by emotional rhetoric or existing political sympathies than by a detailed evaluation of the promises made.

Accordingly, the exercise of conducting a rigorous comparative analysis of electoral platforms assumes critical importance, as it enables a clear assessment of the extent to which these programs address the country's substantive priorities and align with societal expectations.

In an environment saturated with contradictory messages and manipulative campaigns, electoral programs remain clear and verifiable reference points.

When analyzed in context, they demonstrate the extent to which parties formulate realistic, coherent commitments that align with national priorities and citizens' expectations.

A comparative analysis of electoral programs—particularly those of the four parties leading in opinion polls—provides a solid foundation for understanding the real stakes of the election and for guiding public debate toward policies rather than slogans.

Methodology

The purpose of this analytical note is to provide a comparative synthesis of the electoral programs of four political parties, specifically focusing on the promises made by these parties in five key areas.

The methodology employed in this analysis aimed to ensure a systematic and transparent evaluation of the political commitments set out in publicly available documents presented by the parties in the following key areas: European integration, justice, human rights, security and defense, social and economic development, and social protection.

For each area, a set of specific qualitative criteria was established to allow for the assessment of the promises, as well as the parties' understanding of the analyzed areas, the clarity of the commitments, and the feasibility of the promises made.

The analysis includes the parties with the highest likelihood of entering Parliament, based on the average of pre-election surveys conducted between April and July 2025, as well as the start of the electoral campaign (August–September 2025).

Accordingly, the electoral platforms of the following competitors were analyzed:

- Partidul Acțiune și Solidaritate (PAS) – Action and Solidarity Party (PAS)
- Blocului electoral „Blocul Patriotic al Socialiștilor, Comuniștilor, Inima și Viitorul Moldovei” (BEP) – Electoral Bloc “Patriotic Bloc of Socialists, Communists, Heart and Future of Moldova” (BEP)
- Blocul electoral „Alternativa” (BEA) – Electoral Bloc “Alternative” (BEA)
- Partidul Nostru (PN) – Our Party (PN).

According to recent surveys, these formations are considered the most relevant in the parliamentary competition, as they have consistently recorded voting intentions exceeding the electoral threshold or close to it.

The electoral programs of these parties were analyzed through qualitative criteria for each thematic area, focusing on aspects such as:

- ⊙ The presence in the electoral program of a section dedicated to the analyzed area;
- ⊙ The existence and content of relevant promises (five main commitments related to that area);
- ⊙ The primary focus of the electoral program on the respective area;
- ⊙ A description of the electoral platform based on the qualitative criteria established for each thematic area, to evaluate internal coherence, the consistency of proposed policies, the party's mastery of the domain, as well as the implicit budgetary or legislative implications of the commitments (if identified in the program);
- ⊙ The technical and financial feasibility of the promises, their relevance, and the potential for implementation.

Additionally, each area and party was evaluated (with a score from 0 to 5) according to the following criteria:

- a) Internal coherence: measures the degree of consistency between the electoral promises and the party's statute/ideology.
- b) Feasibility and realism: assesses how realistic and sustainable the implementation of the proposals is (e.g., available financing, need for major legislative changes, populist tendencies, etc.).
- c) Alignment with national strategies: evaluates the extent to which the promises are consistent with the main relevant national strategies and government plans (e.g., National Development Strategy 2030, EU Accession Plan, Justice Reform Strategy). The reference documents for each area were identified and selected by each expert to ensure relevance.

- d) Alignment with public priorities: verifies whether the proposals reflect the citizens' primary concerns, according to the most recent opinion polls.

The complete methodology document is available on the ADEPT website, allowing verification of the work process and replication of the study by third parties.

2. MAIN FINDINGS

A comparative analysis of the electoral platforms of four of the main political formations leading in opinion polls highlights a diversity of visions and significant differences in the level of detail, realism, and feasibility of the promises.

The assessment focused on five thematic areas—European integration, justice reform, human rights, security, and the economy—through a common set of criteria: internal coherence, technical and financial feasibility, relevance to public policies, and alignment with citizens' concerns.

A first common element identified is the reference to broadly consensual social issues, such as justice, anti-corruption efforts, and social protection.

All parties make reference to these areas, though with varying degrees of detail and differing levels of anchoring in national strategic documents and European commitments.

Overall, the programmatic discourse ranges between firm commitments consistent with the European trajectory and general statements of intent, primarily intended to mobilize voters.

The analysis shows that political platforms achieve the highest aggregated scores in the areas of Human Rights and Justice (3.5 out of 5), indicating a relatively high degree of internal coherence and alignment with citizens' concerns.

In these areas, parties succeed in articulating clearer positions that are more closely aligned with the electorate's expectations.

However, challenges remain in formulating feasible solutions, which limits the practical applicability of the proposals.

At the opposite end, the areas of Security and European Integration are the least well represented in the electoral platforms, with aggregated scores below 3 out of 5.

This indicates not only a lack of detail and coherence but also an excessive reliance on general statements, with few concrete or operational elements.

Overall, the trend is confirmed that parties score better in terms of the coherence of their platforms with their organizational status and alignment with citizens' concerns, but repeatedly fall short in technical and financial feasibility.

Thus, electoral platforms largely remain instruments for political communication and mobilization rather than realistic governance programs, which may reduce their credibility in the medium and long term.

Table 1. Aggregated scores by criteria analyzed for four electoral competitors

Analyzed criterion	Aggregated score for four competitors
Internal coherence	3.9
Alignment with citizens' concerns	3.4
Relevance to public policies	2.8
Technical and financial feasibility	2.2

Table 2. Aggregated scores by policy areas reflected in the platforms of four electoral competitors

Area of analysis	Aggregated score for four competitors
Security and defense	2.3
European integration	2.9
Socio-economic development	3.2
Justice	3.5
Human rights	3.6

European Integration

The differences are substantive. The PAS party articulates an explicit and firm commitment to European Union accession by 2028, with recurring references to European standards and funding. The Alternative Bloc addresses the topic more circumstantially, using it as both a resource and a motivational factor for reforms, as well as a final objective, with doctrinal dissonances among its component parties. The Patriotic Bloc adopts an ambiguous stance, with declarative statements regarding relations with the EU but without committing to accession as a strategic objective, while Our Party reduces the entire topic to a single-point promise regarding "Schengen accession," which is unrealistic under current conditions.

Justice

In the field of justice, a declarative convergence is observed: all parties recognize the importance of an independent judiciary and anti-corruption measures. However, only some platforms provide more precise, phased measures compatible with European recommendations. Others are limited to general statements or objectives that are impossible to achieve without constitutional amendments and significant resources.

Human Rights

The programs differ in how they define rights and inclusion. Pro-European oriented parties make references to international standards and the strengthening of social protection, sometimes quantifying the expected effects. More traditionalist blocs prefer general formulations, focused on family and traditional values, without references to the European framework or vulnerable groups. In some cases, there is a risk of implicit exclusion or discrimination.

Security and Defense

The comparative analysis shows that none of the platforms provides a comprehensive, technical approach to security and defense. Only one program integrates security as part of foreign policy and the EU accession pathway, but it lacks a distinct section on internal defense and does not include clear budgetary or operational plans. The other three treat security mostly in declarative terms, reaffirming

constitutional neutrality, calling for demilitarization, and advocating a peaceful resolution of the Transnistrian conflict, without specifying mechanisms, responsible institutions, or resources. The level of detail is generally low, proposals are formulated at the principle level, and operational specificity is absent. Therefore, security and defense are addressed insufficiently in detail and primarily politically, raising questions about the capacity of these programs to respond effectively to the real threats facing the Republic of Moldova.

Economy and Socio-Economic Development

Economic promises range from relatively detailed programs, which correlate development objectives with the “European Moldova 2030” Strategy, to lists of objectives with significant budgetary impact but without specifying funding sources. The risk of populism is particularly evident in promises of rapid increases in living standards, comparable to neighboring EU states within a short timeframe, without financial or structural justification.

Comparative Profile

Viewed as a whole, the platforms highlight four distinct profiles.

PAS stands out for its firm pro-European commitment and relative coherence with national strategies and international commitments.

The Alternative Bloc attempts to combine a pro-reform discourse with elements of European integration but is marked by internal doctrinal dissonances and ambitious promises lacking detail.

The Patriotic Bloc favors a declarative and defensive approach, emphasizing neutrality and sovereignty, but with weak anchoring in current processes.

Our Party reduces European issues to an isolated statement, lacking feasibility and coherence with the existing legal framework.


The analysis confirms that the main weaknesses of the electoral platforms relate to the technical and financial feasibility of the promises, the lack of phased implementation, and the absence of budgetary justifications.

The strongest aspects are found in areas where there is public consensus and international pressure (justice, anti-corruption, social protection).

Relevance to public policies and alignment with citizens’ priorities is strong where the topics are also supported by surveys; however, the quality of proposals varies considerably between parties.

3. FINDINGS BY THEMATIC AREAS

3.1 European Integration



Partidul Acțiune și Solidaritate (PAS) – Action and Solidarity Party (PAS)

The electoral program of Partidul Acțiune și Solidaritate (PAS) regards the European integration process as a strategic priority and the main objective of foreign policy, while simultaneously treating it as a precondition and vital source of funding for the success of all other domestic policies, ranging from the economy and justice to agriculture and infrastructure.

To achieve this strategic objective, PAS presents a clearly articulated promise, first as a strategic objective in the preamble of the electoral program: “Signing the EU accession treaty by 2028, before the end of President Maia Sandu’s second term,” and secondly as a major objective in the field of foreign policy: “Accession to the European Union. Over the next four years, the Republic of Moldova will complete the EU accession process and become a full member state within the larger European family.”

Although European integration is a strategic objective, the program does not dedicate a separate chapter with detailed measures. Instead, references to “European funding” and “EU standards” are omnipresent, inserted into nearly all other chapters. Rather than treating European integration as a standalone domain, PAS views it as a transversal element, a main driver of planned activities, and a multiplier of potential results projected/promised across various sectors.

Moreover, this approach, combined with the strategic framing in which pre-election promises and commitments are presented, highlights PAS’s position on European integration as a precondition for the success of all other policies.

The commitment expressed by PAS in the electoral program is firmly articulated through consistently pro-EU language, through the adoption of alignment with the EU *acquis*, culminating in the signing of an accession treaty in 2028. This precise temporal benchmark and references to EU instruments (European Peace Facility, Reform and Growth Mechanism) add to the clarity and specificity of the proposals advanced by PAS.

At the same time, beyond these concrete macro-level promises, the plan does not provide granular details of the actions to be undertaken to fulfill the stated commitment, whether based on negotiation chapters or key stages in the European integration process.

The feasibility of PAS’s promises in this area is moderate, as the target “Signing the EU accession treaty by 2028” is highly ambitious and depends not only on domestic performance (rule of law, administrative capacity, etc.) but also on external factors (member state consensus, absence of major regional crises). References to the use of financial resources and EU instruments indicate an awareness of budgetary constraints, but references to indicative budgets and analysis of anticipated risks (negotiation blockages, absorption capacity) are absent.

Finally, PAS's electoral program on European integration also demonstrates explicit doctrinal coherence, with the integration of the Republic of Moldova into the European Union defined in the PAS statute as "the most natural path for social, economic, political development and societal cohesion in the Republic of Moldova."

PAS's electoral promises also align with the priorities of the National Development Strategy "European Moldova 2030," which is explicitly anchored in the implementation of the Association Agreement and the country's candidate status, through objectives related to the "Europeanization of institutions," strengthening democracy and the rule of law, and alignment with EU standards and values as central directions.

Additionally, PAS's promises regarding European integration are consistent with public preferences reflected in the most recent opinion polls, such as the 2024 Public Opinion Barometer.

Blocul electoral „Blocul Patriotic al Socialiștilor, Comuniștilor, Inima și Viitorul Moldovei” (BEP) – Electoral Bloc “Patriotic Bloc of Socialists, Communists, Heart and Future of Moldova” (BEP)

The European integration domain is not explicitly addressed in BEP's electoral program. The document does not make any reference to supporting the European integration process and does not contain any accession objectives or a clear temporal horizon regarding the Republic of Moldova's European integration. On the other hand, BEP does not articulate any statements or promises explicitly opposing this strategic priority of Moldova. This strategic ambiguity appears intentional: on one hand, to focus voters' attention on other classic topics of the BEP constituent parties, and on the other, to leave room for maneuver, avoiding alienation of voters who support Moldova's European integration.

In BEP's electoral program, there are only two relatively vague promises in the foreign affairs domain that explicitly mention the European Union: 1) "Promoting a balanced diplomacy oriented toward national interests, collaborating with the West and East, developing relations with the EU, Russia, China, and other partners..." and 2) "In negotiations with the European Union, we will defend national interests, protecting the market, producers, and jobs."

These promises are declarative and rely on general phrases such as "permanent neutrality," "bridge between East and West," and "pragmatic foreign policy." The only reference to the EU negotiation process is not accompanied by explanations as to whether it refers to the negotiation process within European integration. Technical proposals are also missing (regarding legislative approximation, screening/negotiation by chapters, responsible institutions, indicators) or at least minimal references to necessary resources or the implementation of these promises.

Nevertheless, BEP's electoral program is coherent with the doctrines of its constituent parties, reflected through the repeated declaration of neutrality as a key element of foreign policy. Beyond this, without an EU accession objective, the BEP platform is weakly aligned with national strategic priorities, speaking only of cooperation and less about convergence (legislative approximation, internal market, energy, competition, etc.). Furthermore, the emphasis on "protecting the market" could conflict with Moldova's commitments under the WTO or DCFTA. Ultimately, the omission of Moldova's European integration topic contradicts the preferences of the majority of citizens who support Moldova's EU accession.

Blocul electoral „Alternativa” (BEA) – Electoral Bloc “Alternative” (BEA)

The electoral program of Blocul electoral „Alternativa” (BEA) presents EU accession as a central objective, integrated into its proposed crisis management and development strategy, and repeatedly references this area in the context of multiple electoral promises.

BEA puts forward the following promises in the field of European integration: 1) "To ensure that the level and quality of life in the Republic of Moldova by 2029 are as close as possible to the indicators of neighboring EU countries," 2) "To restore trust in democratic institutions and the rule of law, to fully meet society's demand for a modern justice system and an independent judiciary. To depoliticize public administration structures and strengthen their capacity for coherent, organized, and efficient activity for Moldova's accession to the European Union," 3) "BEA sees its mission in... accelerating Moldova's integration into the EU, strictly following the roadmap to achieve all accession indicators."

The European integration topic is addressed in a dedicated chapter, "The 14th Reform. European Moldova. The Main Constructive Scenario." The main electoral promise in this chapter is presented as BEA's assumed mission: "accelerating Moldova's integration into the EU, strictly following the roadmap to achieve all accession indicators." Moreover, the chapter explicitly references the source of this commitment, recognizing that "European integration represents, above all, the choice and hope of more than half of the citizens of the Republic of Moldova," and presents European integration as "the main constructive scenario for preserving Moldovan independence, modernizing the economy, fundamentally transforming the quality of life, protecting all languages and ethnic communities, and consolidating the democracy of the entire society." At the same time, the chapter does not provide concrete tools for implementing this ambitious goal nor does it establish specific calendar targets, but it outlines a set of relatively declarative principles that BEA plans to use as a foundation for this process.

Beyond this dedicated chapter, the BEA electoral program periodically references EU accession as a) the final goal or objective of domestic reforms for "restoring trust in democratic institutions" and "depoliticizing public administration structures," b) a benchmark against which proposed solutions will be measured, or c) a tool for implementing promises made. Most often, however, these statements are general in nature and are not supported by arguments regarding practical implementation methods.

In terms of the feasibility of promises regarding Moldova's European integration, the BEA electoral program is characterized by a mix of realism (some alignment with the EU strategic framework) and overly optimistic promises (such as achieving EU socio-economic indicators by 2029). The promise of "a standard of living close to neighboring EU countries by 2029" is very ambitious and may be considered populist without budgetary and structural planning. In contrast, the focus on "restoring trust in institutions for EU accession" is realistic and compatible with the AA/DCFTA and SND 2030.

Regarding internal coherence with the doctrines of the constituent parties, Blocul „Alternativa” shows moderate internal coherence: PDCM firmly affirms European integration as an objective, while MAN leaves this option open, and the Civic Congress is more cautious, focusing on sovereignty and neutrality. On the other hand, there is at least declarative alignment with SND 2030 and the Association Agreement, though without concrete mapping to precise obligations. Finally, BEA references citizen support for EU accession, which adds additional legitimacy to its electoral promises regarding European integration.

Partidul Nostru (PN) – Our Party (PN)

The list of 51 objectives forming the electoral program of "Partidul Nostru" (PN) does not directly address the topic of European integration.

There is only a single point related to European integration, referring to a specific measure: "accession to the Schengen Area to eliminate borders with European countries."

This promise is clearly expressed as a desire ("elimination of borders"), but this objective generally represents a stage that follows EU accession.


Thus, the promise is highly unrealistic in its current form, as the few examples of non-EU states that are members of the Schengen Area are rather exceptions.

Even if theoretically possible, at the current stage such a scenario is highly unlikely and utopian for the Republic of Moldova.

The absence of any reference to the EU, the Association Agreement, or national strategies renders the program unfeasible and disconnected from the realities of the integration process.

Furthermore, the failure to acknowledge this fact suggests a populist nature of the respective promise.

3.2 Justice



Partidul Acțiune și Solidaritate (PAS) – Action and Solidarity Party (PAS)

The electoral program of the party “Acțiune și Solidaritate” in the field of “Justice” starts from real and documented problems: lack of integrity, systemic corruption, and the low quality of the act of justice.

Likewise, the electoral offer of PAS in this field is realistic, coherent, implementation-oriented, and relevant: each measure directly addresses a key obstacle in the reform of justice in Moldova.

No populist or punitive promises are formulated; on the contrary, emphasis is placed on systemic, long-term mechanisms.

The document contains several promises, among which: 1) “continuation and completion of the vetting of judges and prosecutors,” 2) “improvement of the system of investigating and adjudicating corruption cases,” 3) “promotion of a fundamental reform of the legal and institutional framework regarding the recovery of criminal assets,” 4) “reform of the process of entering the profession of judge and prosecutor,” and 5) “improvement of the quality of training and the training offer at the National Institute of Justice.”

These five commitments aim to strengthen the main pillars of the rule of law: integrity (vetting), efficiency (corruption cases and asset recovery), professionalism (entry into the profession), and institutional capacity (training at INJ).

Most commitments are already underway (e.g., vetting, INJ reform, strengthening the capacities of PA and ARBI) and are based on legal acts currently in force or in the process of adoption.

Moreover, all five promises are directly connected with recommendations from the reports of the Venice Commission, GRECO and CEPEJ, as well as with the priorities defined in the Strategy on ensuring the independence and integrity of the justice sector for the years 2022–2025.

All commitments are feasible within the current legislative framework, since they do not require constitutional changes and fall within strategies and plans already underway (e.g., vetting, INJ reform, strengthening ARBI).

Financially, the implementation of the reforms involves significant costs (e.g., the vetting process, continuous training, digitalization of INJ), but these expenses are already foreseen in the 2025 budget and can be supported with external assistance (EU, GIZ, other donors).

At the same time, the sustainability of the reforms will depend on continuous financial resources and post-electoral political will.

Some commitments (e.g., the quality of INJ training, asset recovery) have a longer implementation horizon and their effects are not immediate.

Setting fixed deadlines for examination (such as proposal 2) is risky and contrary to international standards: the case law of the ECtHR and the Venice Commission shows that a “reasonable time” must be analyzed contextually, depending on the complexity of the case, the diligence of the authorities, the behavior of the parties, and the stakes for the claimant.

Moldova has already amended the codes of procedure in this regard, without achieving the desired efficiency.

Without investments in auxiliary staff, digitalization, and functional reorganization, such measures risk generating pressure on judges, lowering the quality of the act of justice, and triggering an explosion of retrials.

The main risk of the promises put forward by PAS does not lie in the lack of realism of these promises, but in the capacity of the executive to maintain the pace of reform in a fragile political context.

Blocul electoral „Blocul Patriotic al Socialiștilor, Comuniștilor, Inima și Viitorul Moldovei” (BEP) – Electoral Bloc “Patriotic Bloc of Socialists, Communists, Heart and Future of Moldova” (BEP)

The electoral program of BEP prioritizes restoring the functionality and integrity of key justice and anti-corruption institutions through transparency, merit-based competitions, functional accountability, and expanding access to justice for vulnerable groups.

In this regard, the electoral competitor presents the following commitments:

1. “reforming the Superior Council of Magistracy and the Superior Council of Prosecutors”,
2. “implementing electronic case files, online summons, video hearings, and a public portal for information access”,
3. “tightening liability for unjustified delays in judicial proceedings”,
4. “strengthening key institutions the National Anticorruption Center, the National Integrity Authority, and the Prosecutor’s Office by ensuring functional independence and allocating necessary resources”,
5. “public, merit-based competitions for appointments to key leadership positions in the judicial system”,
6. “combating corruption through rigorous verification of officials’ assets”,
7. “expanding state-guaranteed legal assistance”.

Most of the commitments formulated by the Patriotic Bloc address real issues documented in reports by the European Commission, the Venice Commission, CEPEJ, or GRECO: deficiencies in judicial digitalization, case examination deadlines, lack of access to justice for vulnerable people, and the capacity of anti-corruption institutions.

BEP's commitments in the field of justice are coherent, moderately ambitious, and generally realistic. The BEP electoral program in the domain of Justice does not contain populist or regressive proposals, and the measures outlined are based on broadly accepted principles in the judicial reform process. The program is clearly structured around sets of measures, with general descriptions of the mechanisms: reforming the Superior Council of Magistracy/Superior Council of Prosecutors without politically appointed members, public competitions for leadership positions, asset verification, and digitalization. However, details about responsible institutions (e.g., Ministry of Justice, National Institute of Justice, ADJA, Superior Council of Prosecutors), specific deadlines, and budget estimates are sometimes missing. Likewise, the classification "politically appointed members" is rather vague and declarative without credible international reports to substantiate it.

Reforming the Superior Council of Magistracy/Superior Council of Prosecutors and introducing merit-based competitions are technically feasible measures and consistent with international practices. The measure regarding tightening sanctions for delays must be anchored in the existing disciplinary framework (e.g., Law no. 178/2014), otherwise it risks being declarative. Creating a network of legal consultation centers requires budgetary and human resources but is possible if based on existing infrastructure (paralegal system, state-guaranteed mediation, etc.).

Although the problem of excessive duration of proceedings is real, imposing fixed deadlines for case examination in court (e.g., 6 months for first instance, 3 months for appeal) is risky and contrary to international standards: ECtHR jurisprudence and the Venice Commission indicate that the "reasonable time" must be analyzed contextually, depending on case complexity, diligence of authorities, parties' behavior, and stakes for the claimant. Moldova has already modified the procedural codes in this regard without achieving the desired efficiency. Without investments in auxiliary staff, digitalization, and functional reorganization, such measures risk creating pressure on judges, decreasing the quality of justice, and increasing retrials.

Digitalization of the system (cases, summons, hearings) is feasible but requires coherent integration into e-Dosar and interconnection with other systems. Strengthening the National Integrity Authority, the National Anticorruption Center, and the Prosecutor's Office is a correct direction but depends on political will and is not detailed in the program regarding resources.

The commitments made align with recommendations from the European Commission, the Venice Commission, and the Action Plan on Justice Reform 2022–2025. They correspond to principles from Chapter 23 of the *acquis*, particularly regarding merit-based recruitment, the independence of the Superior Council of Magistracy/Superior Council of Prosecutors, and digitalization of the judicial system. Expanding AJGS and strengthening the National Integrity Authority/National Anticorruption Center/Prosecutor's Office reflects commitments assumed in the National Anti-Corruption Strategy 2024–2028.

Overall, the BEP electoral program in the domain of Justice is more technocratic than populist, without radical reforms or unrealistic promises. However, it lacks anchoring in deadlines and budgets, which reduces the programmatic strength of the commitments.

Blocul electoral „Alternativa” (BEA) – Electoral Bloc “Alternative” (BEA)

The electoral program presented by the Electoral Bloc “Alternative” in the field of justice is focused on the functional reform of the justice system through technical, administrative, and legislative measures to ensure reasonable deadlines, career transparency, and coherent criminal policies. In this regard, the Bloc “Alternative” presents several commitments:

1. “Ensuring reasonable timeframes for case examination and ensuring the quality of the act of justice”,
2. “Ensuring reasonable timeframes for the investigation of criminal cases”,
3. “Streamlining procedures for challenging administrative acts”,

4. "Ensuring transparency in the appointment and promotion process",
5. "Implementing coherent and consistent criminal/contraventional legislative policies",
6. "Amending the legislation to clarify the procedure for holding members of the Preetting Commission, the secretariat of the Preetting Commission accountable after the completion of its activity, in accordance with the terms provided by national legislation."

BEA identifies a series of real problems (such as excessive durations of proceedings and investigations, lack of transparency in appointments/promotions, inconsistency of criminal policies) documented in CEPEJ, GRECO, and Venice Commission reports.

Overall, the bloc's commitments denote a technical and efficiency-oriented approach. Measures such as ensuring reasonable deadlines, delegating competence in certain cases, eliminating preliminary procedures in administrative litigation, or reforming the appointment/promotion framework address real systemic problems and are feasible without constitutional amendments.

Thus, it is noted that, for the most part, the proposals have high relevance, but some proposals appear politically motivated rather than strictly professional. In particular, the idea that members of the Preetting Commission could be held accountable after their term contradicts the purpose of these independent structures. It creates a dangerous precedent and may discourage participation of international or local experts in future vetting processes. Additionally, certain reorganization proposals (e.g., CNA/ARBI) are not developed in detail, and the absence of essential elements (budget, institutional responsibility, implementation framework) limits practical feasibility.

Financially, the proposed reforms do not involve massive expenses (except for a potential increase in the number of assistants, which requires impact analysis). Many are procedural or legislative in nature and can be implemented with existing resources. The overall relevance is high, but the platform suffers due to a lack of prioritization and some institutionally sensitive proposals.

The proposed measures are partially aligned with the EU acquis (chapters 23/24), CEPEJ, and Venice Commission recommendations (e.g., regarding career transparency, limiting the role of court presidents, proportional criminal policies). However, the idea of holding the Preetting Commission accountable conflicts with Venice Commission recommendations, which call for protecting the independence of these extraordinary mechanisms.

Partidul Nostru (PN) – Our Party (PN)

The main focus of the electoral program of the political party "Partidul Nostru" in the field of justice is on radical changes through constitutional amendments, institutional replacements, and criminal sanctions, subordinated to the idea that "politicization has failed the reform." In this regard, PN presents a series of commitments/objectives related to the field of justice:


1. "Constitutional reform (Reducing the number of deputies in the (51) Parliament of the Republic of Moldova / Drafting and adopting a new Constitution)",
2. "Abolition of parliamentary immunity",
3. "Liquidation of CNA and SIS and creation of a special service functioning exclusively in the interest of the country and citizens, in Moldova and abroad – National Bureau of Investigation" Biroul Național de Investigații (BNI),
4. "Minimum 15-year prison sentences for corruption by high-ranking officials, with the obligation for them to work in prison",
5. "Establishing a legal framework guaranteeing the separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary, with oversight by independent international and local bodies."

Thus, the measures proposed by PN in the field of justice are predominantly symbolic, emphasizing radical changes in constitutional and institutional architecture, but without a clear technical-legal foundation. Proposals such as reducing the number of deputies to 51, completely abolishing immunity, disbanding CNA and SIS, or imprisonment with mandatory labor for high-ranking corrupt officials are barely feasible within the current constitutional framework and risk generating more chaos than reform. They would require complex constitutional amendments, a qualified majority in Parliament, approval from the Constitutional Court, and broad public debate—all of these preconditions being absent from the program.

The proposals conflict with the recommendations of the Venice Commission and the Council of Europe regarding parliamentary immunity (which must remain calibrated), democratic oversight of intelligence services (which requires separation and balance), as well as standards on proportionality of punishments. Moreover, these measures are not accompanied by impact assessments, estimated budgets, or analyses of costs and side effects (e.g., risk of parliamentary under-representation, institutional capture of a single intelligence service). At the same time, the punitive and “force-oriented” rhetoric (e.g., 15-year sentences + forced labor) seems aimed more at electoral effect than at sustainable reform.

Overall, the platform appears populist and incoherent with Moldova’s international commitments, with a real risk of regression regarding the balance of powers, human rights, and the democratic functioning of justice.

3.3 Human Rights



Partidul Acțiune și Solidaritate (PAS) – Action and Solidarity Party (PAS)

In the field of human rights, PAS proposes a “Europeanization” agenda, focused on transposing EU standards into socially funded policies (pensions, aid) and strengthening civil rights, linking their success to the attraction of external funds and the completion of justice reform.

In this regard, PAS presents several proposals in its electoral program: 1) “Increasing the minimum pension and social aid,” 2) “Program to combat domestic and gender-based violence, including development of shelters and counseling services,” 3) “Support services for persons with disabilities and their social and professional inclusion,” 4) “Ensuring equitable access to quality education for all children, regardless of residence,” 5) “Guaranteeing universal access to essential medical services, with focus on rural areas,” 6) “Protecting press freedom and combating disinformation by supporting independent media,” 7) “Ensuring unrestricted voting rights for the diaspora through implementation of electronic or postal voting.”

The PAS platform demonstrates a good understanding of the human rights agenda, though with variable levels of specificity, especially regarding funding.

One of the strengths is alignment with international standards, also supported by references to previous actions. The commitment to combat gender-based violence is based on the ratification of the Istanbul Convention in 2021 and subsequent development of the legal framework. Similarly, policies for persons with disabilities continue efforts to implement the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD). This alignment is essential for advancing toward EU accession and accessing pre-accession funds.

The specificity of the proposals is high for social policies but vague for education and health. In the social sphere, the continuation of quantifiable policies is promised, such as increasing the minimum pension (which rose from 1,188 lei in 2021 to 2,777 lei in 2024). In contrast, promises regarding education and health ("equitable access," "essential services") are not accompanied by clear targets: the percentage of GDP to be allocated, the number of rural schools or hospitals to be modernized annually, or the concrete mechanism for attracting doctors to villages are not specified. For electronic voting, it is mentioned as an option, but a technical roadmap and estimated budget are missing.

The focus on vulnerable groups is precise and data-driven. The platform directly addresses the needs of approximately 520,000 pensioners of retirement age, emphasizing those with minimum pensions. In the field of gender-based violence, the target is reducing the number of victims (in 2024, 926 victims of domestic violence were recorded, 70.5% of whom were women). Measures for persons with disabilities target over 170,000 individuals, according to statistical data. This targeted approach shows the use of statistical data in policy-making.

Financial sustainability is ambiguous and dependent on external sources. PAS's electoral program does not explain how the costs of social increases will be covered from internal sources in the long term. For example, a new increase of 500 lei to the minimum pension for all beneficiaries would require an additional budgetary effort of over 3 billion lei annually. The platform implicitly relies on external funds, such as those from the EU Growth Plan, but does not present an alternative scenario if this support slows down or is conditioned on slow-progress reforms.

Regarding human rights, PAS's electoral program is not populist, but it proposes a coherent development vision. Its relevance is maximal, being directly connected to the EU accession agenda. At the same time, it is a high-financial-risk platform, whose success depends more on the external context and the ability to attract non-reimbursable funds than on the national economy's own resources.

Blocul electoral „Blocul Patriotic al Socialiștilor, Comuniștilor, Inima și Viitorul Moldovei” (BEP) – Electoral Bloc “Patriotic Bloc of Socialists, Communists, Heart and Future of Moldova” (BEP)

In its electoral program in the field of human rights, the Patriotic Bloc prioritizes an extensive social protection agenda, through direct and significant financial commitments, correlated with a conservative vision on socio-cultural rights and a foreign policy based on strict neutrality, as a guarantee of security and sovereignty.

In this regard, the BEP electoral program in the field of human rights relies on a core of very specific social promises and a principle-level identity component, presenting a mixed profile regarding alignment with human rights standards, as follows: 1) “Ensuring a minimum pension of 6,000 lei,” 2) “Indexing pensions and social allowances twice a year, at the level of actual inflation,” 3) “Granting a one-time allowance of 25,000 lei at the birth of a child,” 4) “Reducing the retirement age by 3 years for mothers with three or more children,” 5) “Utility discounts for persons with disabilities and implementation of the ‘Accessible Environment’ program,” 6) “Defending traditional values, the family, and the Orthodox faith,” 7) “Maintaining the permanent neutral status of the Republic of Moldova.”

Some promises indicate problematic alignment with international standards on non-discrimination. The promise regarding “defending traditional values, the family, and the Orthodox faith” is ambiguously formulated and may conflict with Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights (prohibition of discrimination) and the principle of pluralism. ECHR case law has consistently held that traditions cannot justify discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or other prohibited grounds. Implementing this promise through restrictive legislative measures would place the Republic of Moldova in a position of non-compliance with its European commitments. Other social promises do not conflict with international standards.

The BEP electoral program shows high specificity in the social sphere but is absent in the identity sphere. The platform provides exact figures for social commitments: minimum pension of 6,000 lei, childbirth allowance of 25,000 lei, reduction of retirement age by 3 years. These are clear and measurable promises. In contrast, the concept of “defending values” is not accompanied by any implementation mechanism. It is not specified whether this implies legislative changes, creation of new institutions, or funding programs. Similarly, the “Accessible Environment” program for persons with disabilities is mentioned as a title, without detailing accessibility standards or implementation stages.

There is a strong focus on vulnerable groups, but with a contradictory approach. On one hand, the platform directly addresses with concrete measures the needs of clearly defined vulnerable groups: pensioners (approximately 670,000 people), families with children, and persons with disabilities (over 170,000 people). This approach is consistent with a social state model. On the other hand, the emphasis on “traditional values” and “Orthodox faith” risks excluding or marginalizing religious, ethnic, or sexual minorities, creating a hierarchy of rights. Thus, the platform is simultaneously economically inclusive and potentially socio-culturally exclusive.

Financial sustainability is not demonstrated. Social commitments are of a magnitude that exceeds the current budget framework. Cost of minimum pension: A minimum pension of 6,000 lei would require an additional budgetary effort of over 25–30 billion lei annually, an amount exceeding the total current expenditures of the State Social Insurance Budget. Cost of childbirth allowance: For an average of 30,000 births, the cost would be 750 million lei annually. Double indexing would add additional, unpredictable pressure on the budget. The platform does not present any funding sources for these expenses (e.g., tax increases, projected economic growth), indicating a lack of correlation between political objectives and macroeconomic reality.

The BEP electoral program is relevant because it directly addresses the main economic and security concerns of a large part of the population with clear figures. Nevertheless, its feasibility is extremely low due to the major discrepancy between the cost of promises and the state’s financial capacity.

Blocul electoral „Alternativa” (BEA) – Electoral Bloc “Alternative” (BEA)

Electoral Bloc “Alternativa” conditions the guarantee of human rights on a prior structural reconfiguration of the state, proposing radical measures (lustration, constitutional reform) as essential mechanisms to free institutions from the control of interest groups.

To implement this position, the BEA electoral program in the field of human rights puts forward several proposals: 1) “Adoption of a law on mandatory and universal cancer prevention”; 2) “Reform of the pension system for a minimum pension of 50% of the average salary”; 3) “Total lustration of the political class and public officials”; 4) “Establishment of municipal police to enhance citizen safety”; 5) “Guaranteeing access to education through support for teaching staff and modernization of schools”; 6) “Protection of private property and elimination of monopoly schemes”; 7) “Constitutional reform for the creation of a ‘truly popular state’”.

Based on these promises, the BEA electoral program is a project of systemic state reconfiguration. Its vision of human rights is subordinated to this reconfiguration, whose methods are in tension with certain legal standards.

First, it should be noted that the BEA program has low compatibility with the principles of the rule of law. The proposal of “total lustration” generates significant compatibility challenges with European standards. Applied collectively, without clear procedural guarantees for each case, it risks violating the presumption of innocence (Art. 6 ECHR) and the right to work. The recommendations of the Venice Commission emphasize that lustration laws must be strictly limited in time and scope, target only high positions, and provide individual appeal procedures. The BEA proposal does not include these nuances. Furthermore, “mandatory cancer prevention” conflicts with the patient’s right to informed consent and bodily autonomy, fundamental principles in bioethics and medical law.

Moreover, the document’s specificity is limited, as it has a pronounced political manifesto character and a low degree of technical detail. For “total lustration,” operational mechanisms are not presented: which institution would be responsible, what would be the exact eligibility criteria for lustration, and how would the right to defense be ensured? Similarly, the concept of a “truly popular state” through a new Constitution is stated at the level of principle, without specifying concrete changes to the architecture of state powers. This lack of technical detail makes it difficult to assess the degree of realism and feasibility of implementation.

Social rights are presented as ambitious objectives, without financial underpinning. The promise of a minimum pension of 50% of the average salary (which would translate to a nominal value of approximately 6,500 - 7,000 lei) represents a considerable financial commitment. The annual cost of such a measure would reach tens of billions of lei, a major budgetary effort. The program does not present an analysis of the funding sources needed to cover this expense, placing the promise in the category of ambitious political objectives without a demonstrated sustainability plan.

The impact on democratic institutions presents considerable risks. A “total lustration,” implemented without rigorous procedural guarantees, could generate significant instability in the body of public officials and in the justice system. This process could lead to major dysfunctions in public administration and could affect institutional independence. A new Constitution, adopted outside a broad political and social consensus, risks leading to a legitimacy crisis of the political system. Thus, the measures proposed to strengthen citizens’ rights could paradoxically weaken the institutions meant to guarantee them.

The electoral program of the “Alternativa” Bloc is relevant in that it articulates a deep public dissatisfaction with the current state of administration and justice. Nevertheless, the proposed solutions involve a high degree of difficulty in implementation and face major legal and financial obstacles. Regarding financial feasibility, this is not addressed in the document. The program contains no budget impact analysis, cost estimates, or identification of additional revenue sources. Social promises are based on the premise that eliminating corruption will automatically free massive resources, a hypothesis not supported by concrete economic calculations.

Partidul Nostru (PN) – Our Party (PN)

In the field of human rights, “Partidul Nostru” proposes a redefinition of the social contract through large-scale direct financial commitments and structural state changes (a new Constitution), alongside the implementation of socially conservative policies targeting certain minority groups.

In its list of electoral objectives (promises), PN includes: 1) “No pension lower than 5,000 lei”; 2) “Persons with disabilities will benefit from the cumulative pension for age and disability”; 3) “Granting a childbirth allowance of 200,000 lei”; 4) “Abolition of mandatory military service; military service

only on a contract basis”; 5) “Introduction of electronic voting to guarantee equal voting rights for all citizens”; 6) “Banning LGBT propaganda in schools”; 7) “Drafting and adoption of a new Constitution.”

We observe that PN’s electoral program presents a set of commitments with significant financial and legal impact, characterized by a variable degree of compliance with legal standards and principles of budgetary sustainability.

The proposal to ban “LGBT propaganda” in schools is inconsistent with Article 10 (Freedom of Expression) and Article 14 (Prohibition of Discrimination) of the ECHR.

ECtHR jurisprudence, exemplified by *Bayev and others v. Russia*, establishes that such laws are discriminatory.

The proposal for a new Constitution, instead of amending the current one, deviates from the recommendations of the Venice Commission, which encourages constitutional stability. These elements indicate a divergence from the European normative framework regarding fundamental rights.

Specificity is focused on nominal values, with an absence of implementation mechanisms. The platform proposes concrete figures for social benefits: a minimum pension of 5,000 lei and a childbirth allowance of 200,000 lei. However, the document does not detail the implementation mechanisms: the legislative acts to be amended, the institutions responsible for managing the funds, or the sources of financing are not mentioned. The synthetic nature of the platform leaves the proposals at a declarative level, without technical substantiation.

Dual approach to vulnerable groups. The platform correctly identifies certain economically vulnerable groups, such as pensioners and young families, proposing substantial financial measures for them. At the same time, another promise targets a restrictive legislative measure for another vulnerable group, the LGBT community. This selective approach to rights protection contradicts the principle of universality and indivisibility of human rights.

The financial sustainability of the electoral promises is not demonstrated. The social proposals imply an exceptionally high budgetary impact, which is not explained.

Budgetary impact of the childbirth allowance: Considering an average of approximately 30,000 births annually, the total estimated cost would be 6 billion lei. This sum represents a very large public expenditure relative to the national budget.

Budgetary impact of the minimum pension: Setting a minimum pension of 5,000 lei for all approximately 670,000 pensioners would generate additional annual expenses of tens of billions of lei. The platform does not present any analysis of revenue sources that could cover these costs, raising fundamental questions about the economic viability of the program.

The Partidul Nostru platform is electorally relevant, as it directly addresses economic grievances and current socio-conservative currents present in society. However, it faces major legal and financial obstacles regarding implementation. Financial feasibility is one of the greatest shortcomings of the platform.

The program does not present an economic model to support the proposed expenditures. Implementing the promised social measures without identified revenue sources would create a major macroeconomic imbalance, with risks of accelerated inflation or a contraction of the state’s capacity to finance other essential public services.

3.4 National Security and Defense



3,5



2,0



2,0



1,5



Partidul Acțiune și Solidaritate (PAS) – Action and Solidarity Party (PAS)

The PAS platform addresses the field of security and defense through the lens of European integration, peace, and development, reflecting both its pro-EU identity and the general orientation of the Republic of Moldova. Security is presented as the result of diplomacy, the strengthening of external partnerships, and European support mechanisms, particularly through the European Peace Facility. This approach links peace with security: by deepening European integration and cooperating with states in the Euro-Atlantic space, the goal is not only to avoid conflict but also to strengthen long-term stability. Relations with Ukraine are highlighted as part of the effort to enhance regional security, in the context of Russian aggression and hybrid risks affecting the entire region.

The document is strategically coherent, aligning with PAS's pro-European profile and the official orientation of the state. However, the emphasis is more on the external dimension and the record of achievements than on detailed internal policies or specific forward-looking measures. EU support and Euro-Atlantic partnerships are cited, but the mechanisms by which these external resources are translated into internal capabilities—such as layered air defense, dual-use infrastructure, strengthening SIS and IGSU, or border protection—are not clarified. Cost estimates, sources of national funding, and implementation steps are absent, although national strategies adopted in 2023–2024 (National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy) explicitly include objectives such as enhancing cyber resilience, military mobility, and countering hybrid threats. Constitutional neutrality is respected, but without clarification on how it is actively exercised through international cooperation.

From a feasibility perspective, the platform realistically relies on a mix of internal resources and external assistance, but the absence of financial and operational benchmarks makes the plan only partially demonstrable. In 2023, defense spending was approximately 0.55% of GDP, projected to reach 0.6–0.65% in 2024–2025, with a target of 1% by 2030. The platform does not specify how PAS will contribute to reaching this threshold or how it will balance capital investments with current expenditures. Additionally, specific solutions for citizen-reported issues—personal safety, protection of border communities, combating propaganda and disinformation, or rapid incident response—are not mentioned.

Overall, the PAS platform is realistic and consistent in terms of geopolitical and diplomatic orientation, emphasizing European integration, peace, and regional cooperation, including through strengthening relations with Ukraine. However, it remains insufficiently operationalized regarding the concrete security needs of the Republic of Moldova. The document provides strategic consistency and alignment with state objectives but does not detail the practical steps, resources, and timelines necessary to transform partnerships and external funds into internal defense and resilience capabilities. Thus, it partially addresses societal concerns and does not yet offer a complete vision of how peace, European integration, and development can be reinforced through practical and sustainable security.

Blocul electoral „Blocul Patriotic al Socialiștilor, Comuniștilor, Inima și Viitorul Moldovei” (BEP) – Electoral Bloc “Patriotic Bloc of Socialists, Communists, Heart and Future of Moldova” (BEP)

The Patriotic Electoral Bloc (BEP) platform addresses security and defense in a predominantly declarative manner, focused on permanent neutrality, rejection of militarization, and a “balanced” foreign policy between East and West.

The emphasis is on political principles, without accompanying concrete implementation tools. Neutrality is reaffirmed as an absolute foundation, and the reintegration of the Transnistrian region is framed solely as a negotiation objective.

This approach is consistent with the tradition of left-wing parties in the Republic of Moldova (PCRM, PSRM), but the lack of technical and financial measures turns the document more into an ideological manifesto than a public policy plan.

Although the position is politically coherent with BEP’s identity, it is not realistic in the current context. The Republic of Moldova faces direct risks arising from the war in Ukraine — cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, drones and munitions falling on national territory, and increasing pressure on borders.

The BEP platform makes no reference to these threats and does not provide solutions to counter them. Moreover, the explicit rejection of “militarization” is not clearly defined, but it suggests opposition to increasing the defense budget and developing internal defensive capabilities.

Such an option contradicts the National Defense Strategy 2024–2034 and the regional trend of strengthening military and resilience capabilities. In the absence of investments in air defense, cyber resilience, or supporting infrastructure, the Republic of Moldova would remain vulnerable, rendering BEP’s proposals de facto unfeasible.

From a financial perspective, the program contains no projections regarding costs or funding sources. The current defense budget is below 1% of GDP, while the official target is 1% by 2030, which requires gradual increases and consistent external support.

BEP does not mention the European and Euro-Atlantic mechanisms through which Moldova has already received assistance (such as the European Peace Facility or NATO initiatives), isolating the program from the practical realities of security consolidation.

Its relevance for public policy is therefore very limited. The platform does not reference recently adopted national strategies and does not define objectives for key institutions (MAp, SIS, IGSU). Deadlines, responsibilities, or performance indicators are not provided.

At the level of citizen concerns, the document evokes emotionally resonant themes — neutrality, reintegration — but does not address daily perceived problems: personal safety, protection of border communities, countering propaganda, and emergency response.

In conclusion, the BEP program is consistent with its ideological profile but does not provide an actionable framework for the security and defense of the Republic of Moldova. In the absence of operational, financial, and institutional components, feasibility is very low, and relevance to the current context and national strategies is minimal. The document serves electoral purposes more than it does as a realistic state security plan.

Blocul electoral „Alternativa” (BEA) – Electoral Bloc “Alternative” (BEA)

The Alternativa Bloc platform addresses security by reaffirming constitutional neutrality and promising a special law to consolidate this status, with the objective of obtaining international recognition.

The program also proposes a peaceful resolution of the Transnistrian conflict, granting the region a special status, and rejects the idea of “militarization,” promoting diplomacy and negotiations as the only instruments of stability.

These elements define a document that is coherent in a declarative sense and compatible with the profile of the bloc’s constituent parties, but it is not complemented by operational, financial, or institutional measures to ensure applicability.

From the perspective of internal consistency, the message of neutrality and peace aligns with the bloc’s political line and does not conflict with other sections of the program.

However, details are almost entirely missing: responsible institutions, funding sources, and implementation stages are not specified. The concept of “demilitarization” remains vague and is not correlated with real security needs or Moldova’s obligations in strategic documents.

This position is at odds with the regional reality, where states are enhancing their defensive capabilities in the context of the war in Ukraine.

In terms of feasibility, the proposals are not anchored in the existing budgetary framework. The Republic of Moldova currently allocates approximately 0.6–0.65% of GDP to defense, with the objective of reaching 1% by 2030, but the Alternativa Bloc does not address these benchmarks or provide alternatives regarding internal or external resources.

Moreover, the program does not mention available support mechanisms through the EU (such as the EPF) or NATO, even though these represent the main channels through which Moldova currently strengthens its security.

Its relevance to the current risk landscape is very limited. Officially identified threats — cyberattacks, propaganda and disinformation, incidents with drones and munitions falling on Moldovan territory, risks associated with the Transnistrian region — are not mentioned in the document and, implicitly, have no solutions proposed.

In the absence of reference to the 2023 National Security Strategy and the 2024–2034 National Defense Strategy, the platform remains disconnected from state-established priorities, such as layered air defense, military mobility, or cyber resilience.

The Alternativa Bloc formulates a program centered on neutrality and diplomatic solutions, but it is not complemented by practical measures.

In the context of a highly volatile regional environment, the lack of concrete plans to strengthen internal resilience makes feasibility very low and the relevance to Moldova’s current security limited.

The document functions more as a political positioning signal than as an actionable vision for the security and defense domain.

Partidul Nostru (PN) – Our Party (PN)

The Our Party platform proposes a set of radical measures regarding the security and defense architecture, built around the idea of permanent neutrality, the elimination of compulsory military service, and the deep restructuring of key institutions.

The political message is populist, focused on emotionally impactful promises — “Moldova in Safety,” the abolition of conscription, and the dismantling of SIS and CNA — but lacks technical or institutional grounding.

In place of these structures, a “special service” would be created to act in the interest of citizens “at home and abroad,” a vague formulation that raises questions regarding both its mandate and feasibility.

Internal coherence is fragile: on one hand, the objective of expanded security is proclaimed, while on the other, existing institutions are dismantled without clear transition mechanisms, resources, timelines, or responsibilities.

From the perspective of technical and financial feasibility, the promises are highly problematic.

The dismantling of SIS and CNA would require legislative and constitutional amendments, complex reorganizations, and substantial costs to create a new institution from scratch.

Budget calculations, funding sources, and phased implementation scenarios are entirely absent.

Given that the Republic of Moldova allocates less than 1% of GDP to defense and internal capabilities structurally depend on external support, such restructuring has no realistic basis for implementation.

Furthermore, the promises do not address the concrete threats facing the state: border war, hybrid warfare, cyberattacks, propaganda and disinformation, drones and munitions falling on national territory, and instability in the Transnistrian region.

The platform makes no reference to recently adopted strategic documents that establish clear priorities such as layered air defense, military mobility, cyber resilience, and countering hybrid warfare.

In the absence of alignment with these frameworks, the document cannot be considered a basis for public policy.

Neutrality is invoked as an absolute principle, but without clarification of the model (active, strict, or reinterpreted) and without integration into the European and international commitments already undertaken by the Republic of Moldova.

In relation to citizens’ concerns, the Our Party program resonates symbolically through appeals to safety and the promise of abolishing conscription, an emotionally impactful topic for young people and families.


However, it does not propose concrete solutions for the protection of border communities, countering propaganda, or responding to incidents stemming from the war in Ukraine.

Overall, the Our Party platform follows a populist and generalist line: it proposes radical institutional changes but without planning, resources, or alignment with the security context.

Feasibility is very low, and relevance to current national and regional priorities is marginal.

The document has electoral value but does not offer a pragmatic vision of how citizens' neutrality and security could be strengthened within a realistic and sustainable framework.

3.5 Economic and Social Development



Partidul Acțiune și Solidaritate (PAS) – Action and Solidarity Party (PAS)

In the economic and social field, PAS's electoral promises derive from the declared priority of "rapidly raising the standard of living, doubling incomes and exports by 2030, through leveraging the EU Growth Plan, massive investments in roads, affordable housing, a stable and simplified fiscal framework, and strengthening local producers in relation to retail."

To achieve this goal, PAS's economic promises include: 1) "Doubling the incomes of the active population," 2) "Doubling the value of local products and services exported worldwide by 2030," 3) "Increasing the number of kilometers of roads built or repaired by 2029," 4) "Increasing access to affordable housing," 5) "More fiscal stability and simplicity," 6) "We will leverage the EU Growth Plan of €1.9 billion and the opportunities offered by EU accession," 7) "We will support local producers with measures to balance trade relations between producers and retailers."

The promises advanced by PAS address structural bottlenecks already documented in the economy and public policies: standard of living (raising the minimum wage to 10,000 lei, the average wage to 25,000 lei by 2030), external competitiveness (doubling exports by 2030), connectivity (up to 3,000 km of modernized national/regional roads), housing access (25,000 units in 4 years in the Chișinău metropolitan area), fiscal administration (stable rules & digitalization), monetizing EU accession/ Growth Plan opportunities, and rebalancing producer–retail relations. Overall, the cause ⇒ instrument ⇒ result connection is clear at the level of targets and key instruments, consistent with the criterion definition.

On competitiveness and exports, the program provides details on how this goal is to be achieved, specifically through the development of industrial parks and multimodal logistics complexes, increasing the promotion budget fivefold, expanding state aid for investments (with percentage ceilings), attracting anchor investments, and logistics projects (terminals, hubs, ports, rail connections). These address clear needs for diversifying supply and reducing trade costs.

Regarding infrastructure, the target of up to 3,000 km by 2029 is linked to TEN-T integration, the Iași–Ungheni–Chișinău–Odesa highway, and bridges over the Prut—interventions that directly address mobility and logistics chains.

For housing, the approach proposes stimulating private supply (25,000 units) plus financing utilities (water, sewer, energy). Regarding fiscal administration, unpredictability and compliance burdens are addressed through a clear policy cycle (every 2 years), a predictable 4-year calendar, a new Tax Code aligned with EU legislation, payments in a single account, pre-filled declarations for SMEs, VAT

mechanisms, and digitalization of inspections. These proposals directly respond to constraints reported by the business environment.

Although the logic of the interventions is clear, some areas (housing, road construction, investment support) would require additional data on problem size (deficit, price/income, logistics transaction costs) and target groups.

Regarding clarity and specificity, PAS's electoral program contains numerical targets and well-defined deadlines — minimum wage of 10,000 lei and average wage of 25,000 lei by 2030, doubling exports by 2030, up to 3,000 km of modernized roads by 2029, 25,000 housing units in 4 years; the fiscal calendar and instruments are listed concretely (4-year schedule, new EU Tax Code, payments in one account, pre-filling, VAT at point of sale, VAT unification in agriculture, digitalization of inspections). Producer–retail relations are explicitly detailed (shelves, origin labeling, “Product of Moldova,” new law). All these meet the “what, how, who, by when” criterion. Export and competitiveness detailing includes budget levers and support regimes (state aid expansion, promotion budget increases), while logistics lists projects and specific locations (Chişinău intermodal terminal, Bereşti/Ungheni, rail & Giurguleşti port connections).

However, several elements remain unspecified. For example, the increases in average and minimum wages are indicated only nominally, without projections regarding inflation or maintaining purchasing power. Regarding roads, there is no data on how many kilometers have been rehabilitated and modernized over the last 4 years out of the 6,000 km network to understand the additional effort required. Also, parameters such as the cost per km of road are not provided to gauge necessary financial exposure, presented more generally. Similarly, for housing, there are no data on construction rates in recent years or the public resources required to support this promise.

From the perspective of sustainability (long-term impact & financing), PAS's electoral promises revolve around investment and productivity ideas (infrastructure, logistics, fiscal digitalization, industrial parks, technological platforms), which can support long-term economic effects. TEN-T integration and related projects enhance access to European grants and concessional loans, and the program explicitly emphasizes this leverage for infrastructure financing with cheap EU funds.

Regarding income-related promises, sustainability depends on productivity growth. The program links the objective to accelerated investments and external integration (exports, anchor investments), reducing the risk of merely “nominal” increases. However, without sensitivity scenarios (inflation, external shocks), this promise could be met formally but without real impact on population purchasing power. For exports, state aid extension (up to 60% of new investments in production capacity) can accelerate capitalization but must be calibrated to avoid dependency, incorrect selections, and to protect long-term competition.

For infrastructure, benefits are structural, but operating and maintenance costs for the expanded network (roads/bridges) require significant recurring annual allocations. The program generally indicates some capital sources (EU/TEN-T) but does not detail approaches to operating and maintenance costs, which are crucial for increasing the share of assets classified as “good.” According to a Court of Accounts report, noncompliant implementation of strategies for improving the national road infrastructure hindered achieving proposed objectives and increased the share of national public roads in poor and very poor condition from 35.6% in 2017 to 50.3% in 2023.

In fiscal matters, digitalization of inspections, pre-filling, and payment unification reduce long-term compliance costs and can expand the tax base without brute rate increases, which can be considered a sustainable approach.

Regarding coherence with international commitments & existing best practices, the program signals alignment with the EU acquis through the new Tax Code according to EU legislation and the new internal trade law aligned with EU directives (fair commercial practices, consumer transparency). TEN-T integration and connectivity projects are naturally compatible with the European path and associated funding rules. For measures such as proportional investment compensation or interventions along the retail–producer chain, caution is needed to comply with state aid rules and avoid non-selective schemes (risk of distortions).

In internal trade relations, transparency measures (origin labeling, “Product of Moldova”) are compatible with EU best practices if competitively neutral and do not impose quotas/discriminatory obligations. Placing the reform within a law compliant with EU directives is a positive signal of coherence.

Overall, the package is conditionally feasible. PAS does not assume massive recurring expenditures without coverage; the approach to pensions is to increase them as the economy allows. European financing, mentioned as a key source for investments, can provide traction for investments (roads, exports, utilities), and fiscal reforms can expand the revenue base. The main constraints relate to execution capacity, resource absorption, co-financing, and the risk of distortions if support for local producers exceeds the EU/WTO framework.

Blocul electoral „Blocul Patriotic al Socialiștilor, Comuniștilor, Inima și Viitorul Moldovei” (BEP) – Electoral Bloc “Patriotic Bloc of Socialists, Communists, Heart and Future of Moldova” (BEP)

BEP’s electoral program in the economic and social domain focuses on reindustrialization and raising the standard of living through expanding the state’s role in the economy, with a state commercial bank, returning strategic sectors under national control, creating 18 industrial platforms, protecting local producers with a minimum 50% shelf share, cheap and stable gas contracts with a final price of 6–8 lei/m³, and social measures such as a minimum pension of 6,000 lei and lowering the retirement age.

In support of this objective, BEP presents several commitments: 1) “Lowering the retirement age to 57 for women and 62 for men,” 2) “Increasing the minimum pension to 6,000 lei,” 3) “Creating the ‘Investment and Modernization Bank of Moldova’ to finance the country’s industrialization projects,” 4) “We commit to adopting a law requiring retail chains to allocate at least 50% of shelf space to Moldovan products, marked ‘Local Product — Made in Moldova,’” 5) “We will secure long-term contracts (minimum 5 years) for natural gas delivery at a price not exceeding 200–300 USD per 1000 m³, setting the final consumer price at 6–8 lei per m³,” 6) “Returning strategic enterprises under state control,” 7) “Creating 18 multifunctional industrial platforms (PIM) in the country’s district centers, based on access to energy resources, logistic infrastructure, and workforce.”

BEP’s promises are relevant as they address real problems felt by the population: elderly poverty, energy costs, industrial stagnation, but the cause ⇒ instrument ⇒ result alignment is uneven. Raising the minimum pension to 6,000 lei would reduce elderly poverty, but it is an untargeted measure that weakens the contribution–benefit link. Similarly, lowering the retirement age (57/62) ignores demographics and leads to lower initial pensions for women, contrary to international trends of age equalization/increase. In energy, the target of 200–300 USD/1000 m³ and 6–8 lei/m³ tariff addresses price concerns but confuses the goal of affordability with an improbable instrument—a multi-year fixed price without collateral costs. In contrast, expanding multifunctional industrial platforms (PIM) is well-calibrated to deindustrialization and regional imbalances, with substantially higher relevance.

Regarding clarity and specificity of promises, the BEP platform does not indicate sources for about 6 billion lei (retirement age reduction) and about 10 billion lei (minimum 6,000 lei), nor the management of the approximately 114,000 new retirement cases, showing a low level of operational specificity.

The gas promise does not explain the contractual mechanism (indexation formulas, volume/flexibility clauses) or how the final tariff would be achieved below regulated costs (transport, distribution, VAT). The state commercial bank, which instruments all public mechanisms, mixes roles (commercial bank versus policy tool) without explicit technical filters (eligibility criteria, governance, risk management). Conversely, the multifunctional industrial platforms (PIM) have an existing framework and numeric target (18), but without phasing, location selection criteria, or realistic delivery pace. Overall, clarity is medium to low, except for PIMs where the existing framework anchors them in reality.

Financial sustainability is a major weakness of BEP's electoral program. The package with the two pension-related promises would add approximately 18.2 billion lei annually (over 5% of GDP) if both measures were applied simultaneously, with negative structural effects such as deepening the pension fund deficit and lowering the replacement rate (shorter service, especially for women). In energy, even with a purchase price of 200–300 USD/1000 m³, the resulting tariff remains around 10–11 lei/m³; reaching 6–8 lei would require recurring subsidies in the billions—an unsustainable and procyclical solution. The state commercial bank introduces quasi-fiscal risks (losses, resolution, deposit guarantees, recapitalizations), and taking over “strategic” enterprises would create new risks for public finances (buybacks, investments, debt) and discourage private investment. PIMs can have a lasting impact if phased and anchored in demand.

BEP's electoral program has low coherence with international commitments and best practices. The mandatory 50% shelf quota for “local product” violates the national treatment principle (WTO/GATT) and DCFTA/EU rules, risking disputes and sanctions. Operationally, it requires defining origin, methodology, and frequent inspections. Targeting a multi-year fixed gas price contradicts contractual norms (indexed formulas) and recreates dependence on a single supplier, whereas best practices favor source diversification and targeted support for the vulnerable, not generalized caps. The state bank as a commercial entity concentrating public tools is not aligned with European models, where development banks with clear mandates, robust governance, and complementary market roles are used. In pensions, EU/OECD best practices trend toward equalizing/increasing retirement ages (not lowering) for sustainability and intergenerational equity. The promise to grow the state company sector by taking over strategic enterprises contradicts international best practices reflected in the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises. Among promises, PIMs are most compatible with the European framework (pro-productivity/value chain policies), provided state aid rules and competitive project selection are respected.

In conclusion, BEP addresses correct themes, but social instruments (pensions, gas tariffs) are untargeted and unsustainable, market instruments (shelf quota, state commercial bank) are noncompliant or risky, and the takeover/retake of strategic enterprises would create pressure on public resources and governance hazards. PIMs remain the only pillar with high relevance and durability potential if implemented gradually, based on clear economic criteria, and in compliance with international commitments.

BEP's program relies on interventions with immediate social impact, but the balance between promises and budgetary, legal, and institutional possibilities clearly leans toward infeasibility. Overall, the electoral program is predominantly populist.

Blocul electoral „Alternativa” (BEA) – Electoral Bloc “Alternative” (BEA)

The BEA electoral program in the economic and social domain includes the following promises:

1. “Law of Life: the total sum of payments for all communal tariffs shall not exceed 10 percent of the average salary in the economy”
2. “Law of Dignified Return: Programs to stimulate birth rates, financial support for families, child birth payments, support for working parents, and creation of modern infrastructure for children”

3. "Immediate removal of any barriers regarding the method and source of payment for investments in economic and real estate activities by our citizens"
4. "Revision of the anti-reform in the field of entrepreneurial activity based on the license system"
5. "Modernization of communal infrastructure, energy efficiency, street lighting, urban mobility, urban regeneration, including rehabilitation of former industrial areas and their transfer to communities, local development of tools to generate and support economic activities, including support for urban areas with tourism potential"
6. "The investment stimulation package will include large-scale state investments in public infrastructure, fiscal measures – including taxing profits only upon distribution of dividends, modification of the VAT mechanism on imported goods and services with tax payment to the budget after sale"
7. "Starting January 1, 2026, we will legally reduce the gap between the salaries of civil servants and those who, through their daily work, support life in the country – teachers, doctors, social workers. To increase incomes in both the public and private sectors, fiscal and other incentives will be implemented"

The BEA program carries a general message of the "disaster" of the current situation.

Although it addresses real problems such as poverty affecting a third of the population, the exodus of the working-age population, and low investment levels, the program's vulnerability lies in the ambiguity of the proposed solutions and the inherently populist nature of some measures intended to achieve results.

Capping all costs at 10% of the average salary is a vague proposal that provides no mechanism for targeting vulnerable families nor a source of funding for recurring expenses in case of tariff deviations dependent on external factors beyond the government's control.

Furthermore, in 2024 the average monthly costs for tariffs amounted to 759.22 lei/person, which is 5.4% of the average salary, meaning this measure does not solve the poverty problem, even if referring to cumulative household costs.

Reintroducing the entrepreneurial license in trade is a populist measure, as the state already provides a wide range of simplified legal forms for conducting economic activity.

Moreover, license holders have largely formalized their activities as independent workers, with their number in June 2025 being 244% higher than in June 2022 and generating tax revenues in 2024 of nearly 21 million lei, 515% more than in 2022.

Additionally, the transition process from the license system to other forms was also supported by the state through ODA by compensating costs for cash registers.

Increasing salaries for several groups of public employees – "teachers, doctors, social workers" – addresses a real issue of wage gaps between the private and public sectors, but aside from the nearly immediate implementation of salary increases "starting January 1, 2026," the program provides neither clear targets nor sources of funding for these recurring expenses.

The "Law of Dignified Return" is BEA's response to the serious problem facing Moldova – the population exodus.

This law includes a series of measures to stimulate birth rates but lacks clear financial coverage regarding funding sources.

Additionally, the law would involve forming a National Council for Combating Depopulation, whose activities would overlap with ODA's support for entrepreneurs, while ANOFM implements active employment measures including employment assistance and training programs.

The immediate removal of any barriers regarding the method and source of payment for investments in economic and real estate activities is a poorly substantiated promise, yet it has high destructive potential for Moldova as a credible partner in international economic relations.

Even though it is true that with stricter anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing policies there have been some excesses, including regulatory, barriers must be analyzed in a targeted manner without risking pushing Moldova's economy into a grey zone.

The "50 Cities" program provides a clear vision for regional development, given that 2/3 of GDP is currently generated by Chișinău, and the current budget system presumes weak autonomy of local authorities.

However, the program does not address potential transfers of central power, specifically which revenues/expenses would go under local authorities' management, nor what mechanisms to avoid political clientelism in resource distribution would be implemented.

The BEA electoral program offers a list of measures that are clear in content and attractive at a declarative level but insufficiently substantiated as a public policy plan. "Law of Life" clearly sets the 10% limit of the average salary but does not specify a clear funding mechanism: subsidies, tariff caps, compensation, or who is responsible and with what resources the difference is financed.

The "Law of Dignified Return" clearly targets programs to stimulate birth rates, financial support for families, child birth payments, support for working parents, and creation of modern infrastructure for children, providing specific instruments, but formulations are general and do not specify amounts, timelines, or resources – in conditions where such programs are costly. Measurable objectives (how much money/number of beneficiaries, targeted birth rate increase) are missing.

The measure regarding elimination of barriers to investment payments is extremely vague, as it does not directly target which barriers, which actors would be involved, nor any clear timelines. The promise to reintroduce the entrepreneurial license does not explain how reasons that led to its elimination – tax evasion, shadow economy, unfair competition, or lack of consumer protection – would be addressed.

The "50 Cities" program provides a general picture of regional development, with Chișinău and Bălți becoming "accelerated urban development centers." The program lists clear directions such as infrastructure, energy, and tourism but does not clarify from which financial sources these would be realized, nor how decentralization would occur, limiting itself to dry formulations like "a transfer of competencies from central to regional level." BEA does not specify the method for selecting these 50 localities, merely stating "the strongest regional urban centers" without established criteria.

The investment package proposed by BEA, although promising "large-scale state investments in public infrastructure," does not indicate the ambition scale nor the sources of funding. For stimulating private investment, clear fiscal measures are offered, such as VAT payment on imports after sale, taxation of profits only upon dividend distribution, etc.

The public sector salary increase program specifies the "January 1, 2026" date but limits itself to "legislative reduction of the gap" regarding the proportion of increases. No estimate of budget impact or how these expenses will be covered is provided.

Sustainability – long-term impact. The Bloc proposes a wide range of social measures (salary increases starting January 1, 2026, capping communal tariffs at 10% of the average salary, birth rate stimulation programs) which are immediate-impact promises for recurring budget expenditures, alongside major public investments in infrastructure, including the "50 Cities" program.

Simultaneously, BEA promises fiscal measures with major implications for budget revenue collection or cash flow (VAT payment on imports after sale, taxation of profits only upon dividend distribution, return to the license system for entrepreneurs in trade).

Accordingly, promises include many immediate commitments on expenditures and tax reductions on revenue, creating a risk of budget imbalance.

For example, a measure like capping costs for tariffs would create dependency on company subsidies to cover real expenses, forming a long-term unsustainable dependency and risk-taking behavior in resource use. Fiscal measures proposed to stimulate investments would increase uncertainty in tax collection, given companies' tax optimization processes, and are generally procyclical.

State investment programs in infrastructure, including the "50 Cities" program, are sustainable if a detailed plan and stable funding sources exist.

Coherence with international commitments and best practices. The BEA electoral program includes measures compatible with European best practices, especially regarding family support and infrastructure investments. However, some promises – such as capping communal tariffs and returning to the license system – risk contradicting market rules and EU fiscal principles. Overall, the program has alignment potential but requires reformulation and clarification to avoid misalignment risks.

The "Law of Life," as a universal cap for communal tariffs, could contradict liberalized energy market principles and Energy Community rules. Immediate elimination of any barriers regarding investment payment methods and sources risks compliance with AML standards and sanctions regimes, potentially creating risks for financial institutions being perceived as credible partners in international transactions.

Revision of the license system risks creating fiscal distortions and contradicting equity and tax base broadening trends promoted by the EU/OECD. On the other hand, the "50 Cities" program aligns with European cohesion, decentralization, and green transition policies.

The BEA program aims to address a wide range of social problems through promises that would require significant financial effort, which, combined with "large-scale" investments and fiscal and legislative incentives, creates the premises for budget imbalance and thus a lack of long-term sustainability.

The main challenge of the program lies in the lack of calibration of promises to the available financial envelope, which gives it a high degree of populism.

Partidul Nostru (PN) – Our Party (PN)

The electoral platform of "Our Party" focuses on "rapidly increasing the standard of living and supporting the local producer through an active social state with a guaranteed minimum pension and substantial child birth allowance, a network of social stores, mandatory shelf quotas for Moldovan products, investment stimulation through 0% tax on reinvested profits, directing funds to communities through the abolition of district councils and targeted lending via a state bank."

The electoral program, presented as a list of objectives, includes the following promises relevant to the economic and social domain:

1. "No pension lower than 5,000 lei"
2. "Childbirth allowance of 200,000 lei"
3. "Creation of state social stores in each district center"
4. "At least 50% of products on store shelves to be Moldovan"
5. "Establishing a 0% tax on reinvested profits"

6. “Abolition of district councils. The financial resources saved will be directed to localities, which will rapidly influence their development”
7. “Creation of a state bank”

The electoral platform of Our Party for this campaign is essentially a list of 51 objectives without evidence or facts showing that the party reached these objectives through a comprehensive problem-definition process.

Even so, the analyzed set of promises addresses real problems, but the degree of adequacy varies considerably, and most promises do not fully exploit the cause ⇒ instrument ⇒ result chain.

The promise “No pension lower than 5,000 lei” directly addresses poverty among the elderly, a problem validated by statistical data, but the instrument, a national minimum threshold, is not linked to causes such as contribution base, labor formalization, productivity, or inflation. The desired result—poverty reduction—is not accompanied by clear targeting (e.g., only for full contribution periods) or measurable intermediate objectives.

The promise of a 200,000 lei childbirth allowance aims to address the demographic crisis but substitutes integrated family policies (care services, housing, labor market) with a single large transfer, carrying a high risk of short-term consumption stimulation without correcting causal factors.

The promise to open state social stores in every district center aims to improve food accessibility, yet it is unclear why state entry into retail is the optimal instrument, rather than simpler and cheaper solutions such as targeted vouchers or compensations for vulnerable groups.

The 50% Moldovan products on shelves promise stems from the ambition to support local producers but confuses causes—low competitiveness, logistics, standards, fragmented production—with the symptom (small market share), resorting to a local-content measure with potential adverse effects on prices and variety.

On the other hand, 0% tax on reinvested profits targets investments, but adequacy depends on where the real bottleneck is (capital cost, uncertainty, demand, skills, bureaucracy). If the problem is not fiscal, the remedy risks being ineffective.

Abolishing district councils invokes institutional overlaps, but relevance depends on analysis of delegated functions and the capacity of local authorities to assume district council responsibilities, which the party does not detail.

Creating a state bank addresses financing barriers for businesses, but without detailed diagnostics (segments, risk, guarantees), the instrument may miss its target.

Clarity and specificity: The wording of the promises is general and avoids presenting essential information such as how many beneficiaries, when, how, and with what resources. For example, the minimum pension lacks an implementation timeline, conditions (minimum contribution period, indexation), or funding sources, while the 200,000 lei childbirth allowance lacks details on eligibility (income, residency, parity), payment method (installments or lump sum), conditions (vaccination, pediatric visits, early education), or fraud control.

The promise for state social stores does not specify the operational model, beneficiary base, initial investment sources, or location criteria, while the 50% Moldovan products measure does not define what constitutes a Moldovan product (processed location? origin of raw materials? preferential/non-preferential origin rules?). Abolishing district councils does not indicate the timeframe for transition or potential constitutional risks (level II of local public administration is defined in the Constitution as districts), and for the state bank, the operational model—development bank or commercial bank—is unclear.

Sustainability – long-term impact: Fiscal sustainability is the main test, especially for promises with recurring costs. On one hand, the candidate makes promises that would significantly increase public expenditures (no pension below 5,000 lei, 200,000 lei childbirth allowance, opening state social stores in each district, creating a state bank with initial capital), while the 0% reinvested profit tax is a measure that, at least initially, reduces fiscal revenues.

For the goal of no pension below 5,000 lei, stable funding sources are needed through measures such as expanding the contribution base, combating tax evasion, budget prioritization, and potentially phasing in—none of which are addressed in the electoral platform.

Similarly, the 200,000 lei childbirth allowance is a one-time, capital-intensive household expense but creates precedent effects and significant budget impact, which, if not conditional or phased, may generate unsustainable expectations and distortions.

State social stores imply ongoing operational costs (staff, logistics, losses), with risks of permanent subsidies and inefficiencies, whereas targeted alternatives such as vouchers or social cards may be less distortive and carry fewer public finance risks.

On the other hand, the state bank involves initial capital, governance costs, and credit risks (potentially implicitly covered by the state). Without prudent rules and independent governance, it may accumulate quasi-fiscal losses borne by all taxpayers.

Coherence with international commitments and best practices: Overall, coherence is weakest regarding the 50% Moldovan products on shelves and state entry as an economic operator (state social stores, state bank) without governance guarantees. Fiscal and social promises could align if principles of neutrality, transparency, and medium-term sustainability are respected.

The mandatory 50% shelf quota for “Moldovan products” violates a fundamental principle of international trade—the national treatment principle enshrined in Article 3 of GATT under the World Trade Organization, of which Moldova is a member. This obligation requires equal treatment for imported products regarding sales/distribution rules.

Promises regarding state social stores and the state bank should align with OECD best practices for state-owned enterprises with clear separation of state functions, professional governance, precise mandate, and competitive neutrality. Otherwise, there is a risk of disguised state aid and inefficient resource allocation.

Moreover, if the state bank is designed properly, there is theoretically a chance of practical implementation. In contrast, state social stores would require the state to enter a competitive sector, contrary to international best practices, national policy frameworks (SND), and could create barriers to European integration by not respecting the EU *acquis* on competition.

Feasibility perspective: The most problematic aspects are massive social transfers (minimum pension 5,000 lei, 200,000 lei childbirth allowance) and administrative market interventions (state social stores, 50% shelf quota), while 0% reinvested profit tax and administrative-territorial reform could be implementable only with rigorous technical design, phased implementation, and impact assessments prior to resource allocations.

The state bank also requires a clear operational model to fully understand implications and risk matrix, as well as strong governance guarantees to avoid hidden costs and distortions.

4. CONCLUSIONS

The comparative analysis of the electoral platforms of the four parties leading in the polls confirms the fragmented and uneven nature of the political offer ahead of the parliamentary elections on September 28, 2025.

The parties largely appeal to major themes such as justice, anti-corruption efforts, social protection, and European integration, but the level of detail and realism varies considerably.

Some parties set out clear commitments aligned with national strategic documents and international obligations, while others limit themselves to general statements or promises that are difficult to achieve.

Regarding European integration, the differences are most visible: from firm commitments to accession within a concrete timeframe to vague or even confusing approaches, limited to isolated references.

In the field of justice, there is declarative consensus, but only certain programs offer detailed and phased solutions, while the rest remain at the level of general intentions.

Regarding rights and social policies, the differences also reflect doctrinal orientations: some actors invoke international standards and vulnerable groups, while others focus on traditional values and social promises with high budgetary impact, but without clarifying funding sources.

Concerning security, the opposition between neutrality and strengthening defense capabilities remains one of the major fault lines.

The analysis shows an uneven qualitative profile across domains and relatively uniform across criteria.

By domain, Human Rights are the best reflected (3.6/5), followed by Justice (3.5/5).

Socio-economic development is at an intermediate level (3.2/5), while European integration (2.9/5) and especially Security and Defense (2.3/5) are the least covered—predominantly declarative and with few operational elements.

This distribution suggests that parties perform better where there is public consensus and external pressure to comply (rights, justice), while areas requiring finer institutional and budgetary design (security, EU integration) remain superficially addressed.

By criteria, the aggregated ranking confirms better political construction quality than implementability: Internal coherence scores the highest (3.9/5), followed by alignment with citizens' concerns (3.4/5).

In contrast, relevance to public policies/national strategies remains moderate (2.8/5), and technical and financial feasibility is the weakest (2.2/5).

Overall, the analysis reveals that the main strengths of the electoral offers are related to alignment with citizens' concerns and external reform pressures.

The main vulnerabilities concern the technical and financial feasibility of the promises, the lack of phasing, and the absence of implementation mechanisms.

In an electoral context marked by polarization, external interference, and fragmented competition, the comparative evaluation of programs becomes an essential tool to distinguish between realistic commitments and electoral slogans.