FROM **PROMISES**

TO **GOVERNANCE:**

**an analysis of the PAS Government Program
in relation to its electoral commitments**

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FROM PROMISES TO GOVERNANCE:
an analysis of the PAS Government Program in relation to its electoral commitments

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This study analyzes the degree of coherence between the electoral promises made by the ruling Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) during the 2025 parliamentary election campaign and the Government Program *"EU, Peace, Development"* for the 2025–2029 period. The analysis shows that, overall, the government document maintains the strategic direction assumed during the electoral campaign—European integration, justice reform, strengthening security, economic modernization, and the expansion of social rights—but frequently recalibrates commitments by shifting the focus from outcome-oriented promises to process-based objectives, as well as through an uneven level of operationalization.

In areas such as European integration, security, and defence, the Program is more cautious and technical than the electoral platform, reducing explicit political ambition and adapting objectives to the real constraints of governance. In the field of justice, thematic continuity with electoral promises is high; however, delivery remains vulnerable in key areas such as combating corruption and recovering criminal assets, due to the lack of clear instruments and indicators. Regarding human rights, the approach is uneven: education, healthcare, and the inclusion of persons with disabilities are addressed more concretely, while gender-based violence, media freedom, and the political rights of the diaspora are diluted or omitted.

The economic and social block reveals the greatest discrepancies, through the abandonment of certain core promises (affordable housing) and the reformulation of others (lower, absolute targets set in the Program compared to the electoral promise to double the incomes of the active population). Transversally, the study identifies three major risks to implementation: dependence on external funding, particularly the EU Growth Plan; deficits in administrative capacity and human resources; and the absence of a clear framework for monitoring progress.

Overall, the Government Program is coherent as a guideline, but incomplete as a public policy instrument, which may affect both the effective delivery of promises and the assessment of political accountability towards the electoral mandate.

INTRODUCTION

The parliamentary elections of September 28, 2025 offered PAS a new mandate to govern in an unstable regional context and with a major strategic objective: advancing the Republic of Moldova on the path of European integration. After the elections, the Government presented the Government Program "EU, Peace, Development" for the period 2025–2029, a document that establishes the political and administrative priorities of the executive and which, naturally, must be put in relation to the electoral promises on the basis of which the party requested the citizens' vote.

This study analyses how coherent the Government Program is with the PAS electoral platform, not only at the level of general themes, but also at the level of concrete commitments: which promises are taken over in full, which are reformulated or diminished, which are expanded with new elements, and which are missing. The analysis also tracks how the promises are transformed into public policies: whether they are accompanied by deadlines, instruments, responsible institutions and benchmarks that allow monitoring of progress, or whether they remain at the declarative level.

An important element of context is that the Government Program is largely aligned with the National Program for EU Accession 2025–2029. This overlap provides legislative coherence and predictability to reforms, because it sets the direction of harmonization with the acquis and European standards. At the same time, it creates a challenge: the mechanical transposition of EU directives can generate policies that are difficult to apply if they are not adapted to local specificities and the real implementation capacity. Especially in areas such as social or environmental standards, the risk is not only technical, but also social: reforms that are correct in principle can produce unwanted effects if they are not accompanied by transitional measures, support and impact assessment.

Another important contextual aspect is related to feasibility. In several sectors, the achievement of the objectives critically depends on external support, in particular the EU Growth Plan for the Republic of Moldova, estimated at 1.8 billion euros. These resources can cover large capital investments in hospitals, schools, social infrastructure, which would be difficult to finance from the national budget. However, they cannot support long-term recurrent expenditures such as salaries, pensions and allowances. Here one of the central tensions of governance arises: promises of increasing incomes and expanding social protection require stable financing, and this depends on economic growth and the performance of public revenue collection. In conditions of regional instability, this dependence becomes a high-risk challenge.

Finally, a cross-cutting vulnerability that impacts all areas analysed is administrative capacity. In many cases, the main problem is not a lack of money, but a lack of people and skills. Complex reforms such as digitalization, modernization of services, regionalization of infrastructure, integrated social services, implementation of the acquis, require a well-performing and well-paid public administration. The program recognizes the need to modernize the administration, but chronic shortages of qualified personnel and uncompetitive salaries in the public sector can block the absorption of funds, delay implementation and reduce the quality of delivery.

Against this background, the study is structured around five domains: European Integration, Justice, Human Rights, Security and Defence, and Economic and Social Development. For each domain, the analysis identifies points of continuity and divergence between the electoral promises and the Government Programme, as well as the risks that may affect delivery: objectives recalibrated in terms of process rather than results, relevant omissions, lack of operationalisation, dependence on external funding, and insufficient administrative capacity. The purpose is not to challenge intentions, but to provide a clear and verifiable framework for monitoring the mandate: what was promised, what was assumed through the programme, and what will be measurable in the coming years.

METHODOLOGY

The analysis of the Government Programme was conducted based on the methodology developed by the Association for Participatory Democracy (ADEPT) to monitor post-electoral coherence in governance. The analytical approach is comparative and qualitative and seeks to measure the extent to which the governing party's electoral platform is reflected in the Executive's official programmatic document. The assessment process included the following stages:

- **Desk research:** analysis of the PAS 2025 Electoral Platform and the Government Programme "EU, Peace, Development".
- **Extraction of promises:** identification of major electoral promises relevant to each domain under review.
- **Comparison of promises with the Government Programme:** juxtaposing electoral promises with explicit provisions in the Programme, assessing both thematic/terminological correspondence and the substance of the proposed measures (including the level of operationalisation: implementation mechanisms, timelines, budgets, and responsibilities).
- **Assessment of the degree of integration (1–5):** use of a standardised scale, where 1 indicates a vague reference or absence of the promise, and 5 indicates full integration, with clear objectives and sufficient elements for monitoring (measures, resources, and implementation benchmarks).

The analysis aimed to highlight major discrepancies and omissions between the electoral promises and the Government Programme, as well as to identify public policy risks that may affect the delivery of the commitments undertaken. The limitations of the analysis stem from the partial nature of certain operational details in specific chapters of the Government Programme; this was addressed by corroborating the information in the analysed document with that available in related strategic documents (the National EU Accession Programme) and reports of international bodies.

ANALYSIS OF THE GOVERNMENT PROGRAMME THROUGH THE LENS OF PAS ELECTORAL PROMISES

EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

The Government Programme sets out a realistic, technical, and cautious framework for advancing European integration, firmly anchored in what can be controlled at the national level. However, this approach represents a significant reduction in ambition compared to the initial electoral promises, through the tacit abandonment of explicit commitments regarding the accession treaty and full EU membership status, which constituted a central element of the political mandate obtained by PAS.

**Overall degree of integration of the commitment into the Government Program:
2.5 out of 5.00**

Electoral promise	Degree of integration	Score description
1. Signing the EU accession treaty by 2028, before the end of President Maia Sandu's second term.	3	The promise is moderately reflected, as the Government Programme retains the 2028 deadline but links it to the completion of accession negotiations rather than to the signing of the treaty, while the operational connection between these stages is not clearly defined.
2. Within the next four years, the Republic of Moldova will complete the EU accession process and become a full member state of the European family.	2	The promise is reflected to a limited extent, as the Government Programme confirms the European trajectory and the completion of accession negotiations by 2028, but does not explicitly commit to the objective of actual accession and the attainment of EU member state status within the next four years.

The Government Programme treats European integration as a cross-cutting strategic axis rather than merely a foreign policy chapter. The issue is structured within a dedicated chapter, but it is also repeatedly addressed across other areas of governance, where it is linked to internal reforms, alignment with EU standards, and the participation of the Republic of Moldova in European mechanisms prior to accession. This approach indicates an understanding of European integration as a process of internal transformation that shapes administrative capacity, public policies, and the overall development direction of the state.

In relation to PAS electoral promises, the Government Programme maintains the pro-European direction but substantially modifies the level of commitment. During the 2025 parliamentary election campaign, the party articulated two clearly defined outcome-oriented promises: *"Signing the accession treaty by 2028" and "Obtaining European Union membership status within four years."* The Programme retains 2028 as a central temporal benchmark but redefines it—not as a deadline for a final political outcome, but as a target for completing accession negotiations and preparing the Republic of Moldova for accession. This shift moves the emphasis from an external objective, dependent on a decision by the European Union, to a process-oriented objective focused on actions under the control of national authorities.

Compared to the electoral platform, which succinctly described the achievement of European integration through good diplomatic relations and alignment with standards, the Government Programme adds a higher level of technical detail. Integration is explicitly anchored in the National Accession Programme 2025–2029, with an emphasis on alignment with the EU acquis, strengthening institutional capacities,

and developing the human resources required for participation in European decision-making processes. New elements are also introduced, such as pro-European strategic communication and the management of external credibility, as well as the concept of "accelerated integration" through tangible benefits prior to accession.

This technical elaboration is accompanied by a moderation of political ambition. The Programme no longer explicitly states the objective of accession itself within a four-year timeframe and does not commit to achieving the signing of the accession treaty as an outcome of the governing mandate. The electoral promise of a final, verifiable outcome is replaced by a set of intermediate stages—negotiations, alignment, institutional consolidation—which, while necessary and realistic, generate less constraint in terms of political accountability to the electorate. This recalibration shifts responsibility in governance from delivering a clear external result to managing an internal process that is easier to control but more difficult to assess in terms of fulfilment of the electoral mandate.

Although the Government Programme is consistent with the current realities of the European integration process of the Republic of Moldova, the document's main vulnerability relates to the operationalisation of the proposed actions. The Programme refers to the general framework of negotiations and to the National Accession Programme, but does not provide a detailed roadmap by chapters and clusters, measurable progress indicators, or clear mechanisms for public monitoring and reporting. In the absence of these elements, the 2028 objective risks remaining predominantly declarative.

JUSTICE

Overall, the Government Programme is consistent with the electoral promises in the field of justice in terms of direction and thematic scope, and in the case of vetting it even increases the level of specificity through timelines and measures to support the reform. However, the main vulnerability remains delivery: with regard to corruption, asset recovery, and the reform of the "entry gate" into the judicial system, the Programme does not provide sufficient operationalisation, which may lead to uneven implementation and make public assessment of actual progress difficult.

Overall degree of integration of the promises into the Government Programme: 3.00 out of 5.00

Electoral promise	Degree of integration	Score description
1. Continuing and completing the vetting of judges and prosecutors, ensuring that no individuals with integrity issues continue to hold these positions	4	The promise is reflected to a high degree, as it is explicitly included and detailed with a deadline and implementation measures; however, it lacks full guarantees and permanent mechanisms to ensure the long-term exclusion of individuals with integrity issues.
2. Improving the investigation and adjudication of corruption cases to ensure swift and fair examination	2	The promise is reflected to a limited extent, as it is taken over almost verbatim in the Government Programme, but without concrete measures, resources, selection rules, or procedural changes explaining how swift and fair investigation and adjudication of corruption cases will be ensured.

3. Undertaking a comprehensive reform of the legal and institutional framework for the recovery of criminal assets, in order to accelerate the recovery of stolen funds	3	The promise is moderately reflected, as the Government Programme refers to accelerating asset recovery and the reuse of criminal assets, but does not detail the legislative and institutional changes that would amount to a comprehensive reform of this area.
4. Reforming access to the profession of judge/ prosecutor in line with European Commission recommendations; ensuring stability and predictability; improving training at the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) to EU standards	3	The promise is moderately reflected, as the Government Programme largely adopts it as a general direction, but does not specify concrete measures, actions, responsible institutions, or the manner in which European Commission recommendations will be implemented.

In the field of justice, the Government Programme preserves, at the declarative and directional level, the core of PAS's electoral message: all four campaign promises are reflected in the document—completion of vetting, improvement of the investigation and adjudication of corruption cases, reform of the framework for the recovery of criminal assets, and reform of access to the professions of judge and prosecutor, including the strengthening of training at the National Institute of Justice. The Programme demonstrates thematic continuity and does not introduce commitments that would contradict the electoral promises or indicate a shift away from the objective of "cleaning up" and increasing the efficiency of the system.

However, the major difference between the Government Programme and the electoral promises is not one of orientation, but of "density" and practical operability. While vetting is translated into relatively concrete measures, the other three components largely remain at the level of general intention. As a result, there is a risk that in any subsequent evaluations of government performance, coherence will be formally checked ("the issue exists in the programme"), while delivery will not be easy to track in terms of steps, responsible actors, interim deadlines, and measurable criteria.

The highest level of detail in the Government Programme is associated with the first promise: *"Continuation and completion of the vetting of judges and prosecutors, so that no person with integrity issues holds these positions."* While in the campaign the promise was formulated as a normative outcome ("no person with integrity issues"), the Government Programme translates it into a procedural target and introduces elements absent from the electoral platform: an explicit deadline (December 2026) and measures to manage secondary effects on the system, such as filling vacant positions (including at the Supreme Court of Justice) and improving working conditions and technical-material resources. From this perspective, the Programme is more concrete than the electoral promise. However, it should be noted that the maximalist campaign promise cannot be guaranteed solely through vetting: the durable exclusion of individuals with integrity issues also depends on permanent mechanisms for recruitment, verification, accountability, and sanctioning. Furthermore, if the list of individuals subject to extraordinary evaluation is expanded, the completion deadline becomes more difficult to meet, which may render the target more aspirational than certain.

Regarding the second electoral promise, *"improving the investigation and adjudication of corruption cases for swift and fair examination,"* the Government Programme retains the electoral wording almost verbatim, referring to "swift and fair" examination, but does not add the minimal tools that would make the objective credible and verifiable. It does not specify what will change in investigative and judicial practices, how specialized judges and prosecutors will be selected, what resources will be allocated, or how the institutional and logistical components will be addressed (including the infrastructure required for the specialized court and prosecution office, where legal obligations already exist). Without such bench-

marks, the promise remains exposed to the risk of being subsequently assessed through disparate actions that may be reported as progress, but without a clear link to the actual acceleration of case examination and without guarantees regarding the quality of justice.

In the area of criminal asset recovery, there is a noticeable shift in emphasis. The electoral promise, *"Thorough reform of the legal and institutional framework for the recovery of criminal assets to enable faster recovery of stolen funds,"* invoked a "thorough" reform of the legal and institutional framework, whereas the Government Programme focuses primarily on specific outcomes, such as "accelerating confiscation," and broadens the agenda by including the reuse of confiscated assets for social/public purposes. This expansion can be seen as a useful addition, but it leaves unclear the structural dimension initially promised: what exactly will be reformed, through which instruments, in which institutions, with what performance indicators, and with what practical capacity-building measures for actors in the recovery "chain" (such as ARBI and other relevant institutions). In the absence of these clarifications, there is a risk that the intervention may be limited to targeted legislative changes, without a proportional increase in actual recoveries.

Ultimately, the commitment to *"reforming access to the profession of judge/prosecutor in line with EC recommendations; ensuring stability and predictability; improving training at the National Institute of Justice to EU standards"* is taken over almost in its entirety by the Government Programme. However, this anchoring remains abstract, as it is not translated into identifiable actions, such as new admission criteria, assessment of the institutional capacity of the National Institute of Justice, transparency of procedures, practical traineeships, human resources strategies, or measures related to the attractiveness and stability of the career (including remuneration and retention components), elements that have appeared in previous technical recommendations. As a result, the commitment exists, but it does not take the form of an implementation plan that would subsequently allow monitoring of progress in the implementation of the respective government programme.

HUMAN RIGHTS

In the field of human rights, the "EU, Peace, Development" Government Programme largely maintains the pro-European and modernising direction of the PAS electoral platform, but transposes it with uneven intensity: some commitments are transformed into objective, quantifiable targets and explicit investments, while others are diluted, conceptually reframed, or even omitted. The result is a mixed picture, in which social rights and access to public services are addressed in relatively detailed terms, while politically or culturally sensitive issues—such as gender-based violence, freedom of the press (from the perspective of economic sustainability), and the political rights of the diaspora—are approached with excessive caution or disappear from the list of verifiable priorities.

Overall degree of integration of the promises into the Government Programme: 3.00 out of 5.00

Electoral promise	Degree of integration	Score description
1. Increasing the minimum pension and social assistance benefits	3	The promise is moderately reflected, as the Government Programme provides for the continued increase of pensions and the expansion of social support, but avoids committing to a clear numerical target for the minimum pension, indicating a cautious approach focused more on processes and services than on a guaranteed outcome.

2. Support services for persons with disabilities and their social and professional inclusion	**2**	The promise is reflected to a limited extent, as the Government Programme addresses domestic violence primarily from a public order perspective, without explicit commitments to the development of shelters and specialised counselling services envisaged in the electoral promise.
3. Support services for persons with disabilities and their social and professional inclusion	**4**	The promise is reflected to a high degree, as the Government Programme translates it into quantifiable targets, cross-cutting measures for social and professional inclusion, and new support instruments, going beyond a strictly assistance-based approach.
4. Ensuring equitable access to quality education for all children, regardless of place of residence	**5**	The promise is reflected to a very high degree, as the Government Programme fully translates it through major investments, the expansion of educational infrastructure, clear performance targets, and concrete measures to reduce disparities between rural and urban areas.
5. Guaranteeing universal access to essential healthcare services, with a focus on rural areas	**4**	The promise is reflected to a high degree, as the Government Programme translates it through structural investments in regional healthcare infrastructure, full system digitalisation, and the expansion of preventive medicine, addressing rural access indirectly but consistently.
6. Protecting media freedom and combating disinformation by supporting independent media	**3**	The promise is moderately reflected, as the Government Programme emphasises media literacy, regulation, and information security, but does not provide for direct financial mechanisms to support independent media, as committed during the electoral campaign.
7. Ensuring the unrestricted right to vote for the diaspora through the implementation of electronic or postal voting	**0**	The promise is not reflected in the Government Programme.

In the area of social protection, the commitment to *increasing the minimum pension and social benefits* remains present, but the register changes: from expectations of a numerical outcome to process-oriented formulations. The Programme refers to the "continuous increase of pensions" and to the expansion of the base of beneficiaries of social services, but does not propose an explicit target for the minimum pension, in contrast to other chapters where it assumes clear figures (for example, for the minimum wage and the average wage). This difference suggests a deliberate adjustment to budgetary sustainability constraints and, implicitly, a reduction in predictability for beneficiaries. At the same time, the Programme partially compensates for this approach through a reorientation towards services: it commits to expanding social services and introduces direct support measures for families with children with disabilities. In addition, the emphasis on signing new pension agreements represents a technical intervention with relevant effects in terms of rights, particularly for the diaspora and migrant workers, through the portability of social rights. The major risk, however, remains the erosion of the purchasing power of the minimum pension if increases do not exceed inflation, and if expanded social services fail to compensate for immediate material short-falls, especially in rural areas.

A problematic discrepancy can be observed about *combating domestic violence and gender-based violence*. Here, the difference between the electoral promise and the approach in the Programme is not merely one of detail, but of paradigm. During the campaign, PAS placed the issue within the sphere of

fundamental rights and social protection, with an emphasis on developing the network of shelters and specialised counselling services. In the Government Programme, however, the topic is moved into the area of "safe communities", and the proposed response centres on the presence of public order structures and the deterrence of criminal behaviour. This repositioning of the phenomenon reduces the visibility of integrated support interventions (shelter, psychological assistance, legal aid, economic rehabilitation), which are essential in the spirit of the Istanbul Convention and in line with the recommendations of specialised bodies. The lack of explicit reference to the expansion of specialised services and dedicated resources increases the risk that victims will, in practice, be left without real options to exit a violent environment, especially in rural areas or in the case of women with disabilities. In this context, the political signal conveyed by the gender composition of the new cabinet amplifies the perception of reduced priority and weakens the credibility of the commitment to gender equality.

At the same time, *the rights of persons with disabilities and their social and professional inclusion* are among the areas in which the Programme offers a more extensive commitment than the electoral promises, by introducing outcome targets and instruments of direct support. A 30% increase in the number of beneficiaries of social services and the objective of ensuring adapted access to education for 80% of children with special educational needs constitute measurable benchmarks that allow for subsequent monitoring. The Programme also goes beyond an assistance-centred model, referring to integration into the labour market and entrepreneurship. However, two vulnerabilities remain: the risk that solutions such as directing beneficiaries towards "day centres" may turn into segregation practices if not accompanied by genuine integration into mainstream education and training, and the risk that employment measures may be blocked by limited administrative capacity and bureaucracy, in the absence of effective administrative simplification and functional incentives for employers.

Education emerges as the most coherent and best operationalised pillar of the Programme from a human rights perspective, with a full transposition of *the commitment to equitable access to quality education.* The commitments are supported by explicit financial allocations, by mechanisms (the expansion of the "Model Schools" network), and by performance indicators (for example, targets related to examination results). This approach transforms a general promise into a reform plan with a clear structural logic. At the same time, the strategy involves an optimisation of the school network that may generate social costs: if pupil transportation and access infrastructure are not managed flawlessly, children from isolated localities may, in practice, lose part of the promised access. A second vulnerability concerns human resources: the commitment to annually recruit a large number of young teachers is necessary but difficult in the current demographic and budgetary context, and failure on this component may reduce the impact of investments in educational infrastructure.

In the health sector, the Programme responds to the promise of *universal access to essential medical services* through a combination of regionalisation and digitalisation: regional hospitals and the digital medical record are systemic solutions that can reduce geographical inequalities and bureaucratic barriers. The emphasis on screening and prevention indicates an orientation towards modern public health. However, the weak link once again remains human resources: without sufficiently attractive measures for doctors in rural areas, infrastructure alone cannot lead to increased real access.

Regarding *freedom of the press and the fight against disinformation*, the Programme shifts the emphasis from direct economic support for independent media towards an approach focused on information resilience: media literacy, a media development strategy, and strategic communication. This orientation may be justified by the context of hybrid threats, but it leaves unaddressed the core issue of the economic sustainability of media institutions, especially local ones. Moreover, the concept of "pro-European strategic communication" raises a public policy integrity concern: without transparency rules and equitable allocation, there is a risk that funds may be channelled in a discretionary manner, affecting pluralism. Structural reforms aimed at alignment with European regulations (such as those concerning platforms and media freedom) may strengthen this field, but their implementation is complex and long-term and does not substitute the need for urgent measures to ensure the sector's viability.

The most serious discrepancy between the electoral promises and the Government Programme is found in the political rights of the diaspora. *The promise of electronic or postal voting*, central to the electoral campaign, is absent from the governance document, where the diaspora is treated predominantly as an economic and cultural resource (investment, ties, cultural diplomacy). The absence of a commitment to extend and institutionalise remote voting mechanisms indicates a reduced priority, likely explained by security considerations and the lack of political consensus, but it risks generating credibility costs and undermining voter mobilisation abroad. Maintaining dependence on physical polling stations and ad hoc administrative decisions does not, in a strict sense, guarantee "unrestricted" voting for the diaspora, as promised during the campaign.

Taken together, these elements of the Government Programme indicate a tendency of governance to partially move away from electoral promises framed as immediate and easily communicable outcomes, in favour of administrative pragmatism based on investment, infrastructure, and digitalisation, strongly anchored in the EU accession process and external financing. This "pragmatism" may enhance long-term sustainability but simultaneously creates an expectations gap where the electorate was mobilised by concrete promises (pensions, protection for victims, remote voting, support for the media). Coherence between promises and the Government Programme is high where the Programme provides instruments, budgets, and indicators (education, health, inclusion), and fragile where issues are controversial, prone to politicisation, or require costly and sensitive social interventions (gender-based violence, media, diaspora).

SECURITY AND DEFENCE

In the field of security and defence, the Government Programme is consistent with PAS's electoral promises on security in terms of direction—diplomacy, European integration, partnerships, and peaceful reintegration—but recalibrates them into language that maximises strategic flexibility and minimises the potential for escalation. At the same time, it introduces a major expansion through the military pillar, justifiable given the security environment, but one that raises increased requirements for transparency, prioritisation, and progress measurement, in order to preserve the integrity of the mandate and the capacity for public monitoring.

Overall degree of integration of the promises into the Government Programme: 3.83 out of 5.00

Electoral promise	Degree of integration	Score description
1. Strengthening security through diplomacy and European integration	4	The promise is reflected to a high degree, being clearly integrated at the strategic and conceptual level in the Government Programme; however, it lacks operational priorities, concrete instruments, and measurable indicators linking diplomacy to tangible security outcomes.
2. Strengthening bilateral strategic partnerships (Romania, Ukraine, the EU, the Euro-Atlantic space, Central Asia, Southeast Asia, the Middle East) for economic development and security	4	The promise is reflected to a high degree, having been almost fully taken over as a geographical orientation and objective in the Government Programme; however, it lacks concrete measures, cooperation formats, sectoral priorities, and expected results necessary for full operationalisation.

3. Enhancing multilateral cooperation (the UN, the Council of Europe, the OSCE) in support of national interests, reintegration, investment, and democratic consolidation	4	The promise is reflected to a high degree and is explicitly included in the Government Programme; however, it lacks measurable objectives, concrete positioning, and targeted outcomes to ensure operational integration.
4. Identifying measures for the gradual and irreversible integration of the Transnistrian region into unified national spaces (economic, fiscal, customs, legal, etc.), leveraging opportunities provided by European integration	4	The promise is reflected to a high degree, being almost fully incorporated and clearly linked to European integration; however, it lacks defined stages, concrete instruments, and implementation mechanisms necessary for full operationalisation.
5. Increasing the attractiveness of peaceful reintegration for the population of the Transnistrian region through educational programmes, public services, and information	4	The promise is reflected to a high degree, being clearly integrated as a direction and logic in the Government Programme; however, it lacks dis-tinct programmes, dedicated budgets, and in-dicators to measure the attractiveness of reinte-gration for the population.
6. Engaging international partners in supporting a phased and sustainable reintegration plan (the EU, the United States, Ukraine, Romania, the OSCE, the UN)	3	The promise is moderately reflected, as the Government Programme primarily emphasises the role of the EU and does not fully incorporate the involvement of all the international partners mentioned, nor the concept of a clearly defined phased reintegration plan.

In the field of security and defence, the Government Programme maintains the fundamental direction of the PAS electoral platform, but shifts into a more cautious and technical register, specific to governing in a regionally unstable and militarised context due to the war in Ukraine. Continuity is evident in maintaining security as a product of foreign policy, diplomacy, European integration, strategic partnerships, and multilateralism, as well as in the fact that the Transnistrian issue remains an integral part of the security architecture, addressed through peaceful instruments and the logic of gradual convergence.

The promise of *"security through diplomacy and European integration"* is consistently incorporated into the Government Programme, but reformulated to avoid the implicit idea present in the electoral discourse that European integration would automatically provide security guarantees. Instead of a direct causal relationship, the Programme describes security as the result of a gradual accumulation: normative alignment, selective participation in the European security architecture, intensified diplomatic dialogue, and increased resilience. This nuance reflects an adaptation to the real constraints of a neutral, vulnerable state exposed to hybrid pressures, for which maximalist promises would be difficult to uphold.

Regarding *the promise on bilateral strategic partnerships*, the government document largely preserves the geography outlined during the electoral campaign—neighbours, the EU, the Euro-Atlantic space, and priority regions (Central Asia, Southeast Asia, the Middle East)—and links them to economic development, stability, and the strengthening of security, including through enhanced participation in international peacekeeping missions. The Programme does not clarify the type of cooperation pursued (formats, instruments, interoperability, training, logistics, cyber) nor which annual outcomes or indicators would confirm the "strengthening" of partnerships, leaving the promise well integrated as an intention but incomplete as an execution plan.

The same logic is observed regarding the promise to **enhance multilateral cooperation** (UN, Council of Europe, OSCE), where the Programme reaffirms active participation and the use of platforms for national interests, reintegration, investment, and the consolidation of democracy, yet without specifying priority dossiers, concrete initiatives, or targets for influence and representation. The result is a solid integration of the promises at the strategic level, but one that remains difficult to monitor in terms of outcomes.

On the Transnistrian file, the Programme maintains **the promise of gradual integration into unified national spaces** and even formulates it more broadly in coverage (legal, economic, customs, fiscal, social, informational, political), with a clear message regarding the uniform application of legislation harmonised with the EU across the entire territory of the country. However, the language is recalibrated: the notion of "irreversibility" present in the electoral formulations disappears, and convergence is explicitly placed under the imperative of maintaining peace and stability. This adjustment suggests a governance choice oriented towards risk control and avoiding steps perceived as political or economic coercion, even if symbolically it weakens the declarative ambition of the initial promise. At the same time, the Programme more clearly emphasises than during the campaign the promise to **increase the "attractiveness" of reintegration** for the population: quality and non-discriminatory public services, access to education, health, energy, documentation, and economic activities, alongside the continuation of confidence-building projects. Reintegration is presented less as a political project and more as the result of a visible difference in quality of life, an approach closer to ground realities and the logic of human security.

In contrast, the promise to **involve international partners in supporting a phased reintegration plan** is taken up more narrowly than in the electoral promises. Whereas PAS had explicitly outlined a broad framework (EU, USA, Ukraine, Romania, OSCE, UN), the Programme focuses on the European Union as having the primary role and formulates more generally the use of diplomatic instruments to reduce risks, including the idea of transforming the peacekeeping mission into a civilian one. This "Europeanisation" of the file can be interpreted as a choice for institutionalised and predictable support, but it clearly reduces clarity regarding coordination with other relevant actors and does not provide an explicit mechanism for a "phased plan" or the management of external assistance.

The most significant novelty of the Programme, explicitly absent from the set of analysed electoral promises, is the emergence of a substantial military defence pillar, articulated in the chapter "Capable Defence." Here, the agenda expands from security defined mainly through diplomacy and reintegration to the strengthening of internal capabilities: increasing the attractiveness of military service and social guarantees, military education and research, modernisation of structures and equipment, reinforcement of national resilience and response to hybrid threats, inter-institutional cooperation, and gradual integration into the European security architecture through normative alignment and common standards. This expansion delivers, in a strict sense, "more" than was promised in the security–defence segment, being strategically justifiable after 2022, but it also creates a discrepancy with the mandate received from citizens: military modernisation, capability priorities, and budgetary implications were not communicated explicitly to the electorate, which would have required a clearer public justification.

From this derive the main vulnerabilities of the Programme in the field of security and defence. The document remains too general in a sector where credibility depends on clear choices: what is a priority, what is financed first, and over what timeframe. The Programme does not explain budgetary trajectories and does not establish a hierarchy of critical capabilities, even though defence modernization—from interoperability and alert systems to cyber security and mobility—entails significant costs and decisions that cannot be postponed or executed simultaneously.

In addition, dependence on external support is implicit but not treated as a public policy risk: it is unclear what would happen if assistance decreases or procurements are delayed. Domestically, hybrid threats and information/cyber security are acknowledged, but are not translated into a set of measures, respon-

sibilities, and outcomes that can be monitored. In the Transnistrian dimension, convergence remains a direction, but without explicit phasing or defined end points, which may render reintegration a prolonged technical process, vulnerable to blockages and external pressures.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

The Government Programme translates, to a certain extent, PAS's electoral commitments in the economic and social fields. It sets more ambitious targets for measures such as stimulating exports or rehabilitating roads. In contrast, increasing access to housing or introducing a new EU-compliant fiscal code has not been incorporated. The lack of problem descriptions, priority actions, timelines, and responsible actors will affect the monitoring and implementation of these measures.

Overall degree of integration of the commitment into the Government Program: 2.42 out of 5.00

Electoral promise	Degree of integration	Score description
1. Doubling the incomes of the active population. Increasing the minimum wage from 5,500 lei to 10,000 lei. Raising the average wage to at least 25,000 lei by 2030. Minimum and average pensions will increase steadily.	2	The promise is only partially reflected, through references to wage and pension increases, but without an explicit commitment to doubling incomes, without clear targets adjusted for inflation, and without concrete measures for the targeted professional categories.
2. Doubling the value of domestically produced goods and services exported worldwide by 2030.	3	The promise is moderately reflected, as the Program sets an export target even higher than the announced doubling; however, it does not explain how the proposed measures will ensure its achievement and does not include intermediate time-bound milestones.
3. Up to 3,000 km of additional roads built or rehabilitated by 2029, so that the entire national and regional road network is in good condition.	3	The promise is moderately reflected. The current pace of road rehabilitation and the planned resources do not clearly indicate how the 3,000 km target by 2029 could be achieved.
4. Increasing access to affordable housing by stimulating the construction of at least 25,000 housing units in the peri-urban areas of Chișinău. Drafting a National Housing Strategy.	0	The promise is not reflected in the Government Program.
5. Greater fiscal stability and simplicity by adopting fiscal changes no more frequently than once every two years; simplifying payments to the budget; unifying VAT in the agricultural sector; full digitalization of fiscal control processes.	2	The promise is reflected at a low level, as the Government Program is limited to general statements on fiscal predictability, without concrete measures, clear deadlines, or an explicit commitment to adopting a new Fiscal Code aligned with EU legislation.

6. Leveraging the EU Growth Plan of €1.9 billion and the opportunities offered by accession to the European Union.	3	The promise is moderately reflected, as the Government Program mentions leveraging the EU Growth Plan but does not detail the actions required to meet the conditionalities for the disbursement of funds.
7. Supporting local producers through measures to balance commercial relations between producers and retailers.	4	The promise is reflected at a high level, supported by clear measures and actions in the Government Program, though without setting explicit targets or timelines.

In the dimension of economic and social development, the Government Programme incorporates a significant part of PAS's electoral themes, but translates them with a very uneven degree of clarity and fidelity to the original promises. Continuity is evident at the level of general directions: income growth, export stimulation, infrastructure, fiscal predictability, utilisation of EU funds, and support for local producers. However, the government document frequently uses formulations and targets that either do not correspond to the core promise (for example, "doubling incomes") or are insufficiently operationalised to allow credible evaluation and monitoring.

The most sensitive discrepancy arises around the symbolic campaign promise: *doubling the incomes of the active population*. The Programme includes targets for the minimum and average wage, but these do not, relative to 2025 levels, equate to a doubling within the governance period envisaged in the campaign. Moreover, the targets are expressed in absolute values, without anchoring in purchasing power and without explicit mechanisms to safeguard the impact of increases under high-inflation scenarios. The Programme links the growth of the average wage to productivity and economic performance, an economically justifiable approach, but one that transforms the electoral promise from a firm commitment into an objective dependent on external conditions. More importantly, specific promises to double the incomes of categories such as teachers, doctors, or police officers, announced during the campaign, are not explicitly adopted. Regarding pensions, the Programme only retains the idea of continuous growth, without annual targets, amounts, or clearly specified sources, shifting the promise from a measurable action to the realm of intention.

In contrast, regarding exports, the Programme sets a target even more ambitious than the electoral promise. While the campaign commitment *aimed to double the value of goods and services exported by 2030* through financial support, industrial parks, and logistics, the Programme establishes a share-based target: exports of at least 50% of GDP by 2030. Relative to the recent economic structure, this target would represent a significant leap, exceeding the implicit scale of the "doubling" envisaged during the campaign. The difference is not necessarily negative in ambition, but it becomes problematic due to the absence of an implementation plan: there are no intermediate milestones, concrete financial instruments, priority sectors, logistical reforms, or institutional capacities described to make achieving such a high threshold credible.

Regarding road infrastructure, the Programme maintains the goal of *rehabilitating up to 3,000 km* of national roads (so that the entire national road network reaches good quality) and introduces a novelty: ensuring road quality according to EU standards, which would imply moving from an assessment currently limited to the International Roughness Index (IRI) to a much more complex approach (including indicators such as safety, durability, load-bearing capacity, road availability, congestion, etc.). Theoretically, this expansion is a step forward, as it raises the quality standard and aligns the objective with European criteria. Practically, however, it amplifies the feasibility problem: the Programme does not explain how to finance and deliver such a large annual rehabilitation volume, in a context where the network's condition remains poor, historical progress has been slow, and budget projections indicate risks of underfunding the road fund. The lack of intermediate milestones and an implementation model (prioritisation of sections, design/construction capacity, maintenance management) renders the objective vulnerable to delays and selective reporting.

A strong contrast is found in the issue of affordable housing: *the major campaign promise to stimulate the construction of at least 25,000 homes around Chișinău, expand technical and utility networks, and develop a National Housing Strategy* is absent from the Programme. This is not a mere nuance, but a substantive omission, with direct social implications, especially in a context of pressure on the real estate market and rapid urbanisation. The complete absence of this promise reduces the Programme's coherence with the electoral mandate on a topic with high socio-economic significance.

On *taxation*, the Programme adopts the idea of stability and simplicity, but does not translate the concrete elements that gave substance to the electoral promise: *limiting the frequency of tax changes (once every two years), adopting a new Fiscal Code aligned with European legislation, full digitalisation of fiscal control and automated risk identification, simplification of payments*, and other specific measures. Furthermore, the discussion on fiscal predictability is undermined by signals of inconsistency in budgetary practice (for example, reporting on compliance with budget planning stages and deficit discipline), creating a gap between the promise of "stability" and the anticipated fiscal-budgetary governance approach.

The Programme mentions the utilisation of the EU Growth Plan, but without describing the internal mechanisms needed to fulfil disbursement conditions, which is essential when external financing becomes pivotal for investment and modernisation. Thus, a strategic commitment is confirmed, but it remains insufficiently translated into governance actions (coordination, administrative capacity, reform calendar, institutional responsibilities).

In the area of *support for local producers and balancing relations between producers and traders*, the Programme appears closer to the electoral promise, by adopting clearer measures. However, the temporal component is missing here as well: without deadlines and indicators, it remains unclear when and how market effects will materialise and how it will be measured whether commercial relationships actually become "more balanced."

Overall, the economic and social block of the Government Programme maintains thematic coherence with PAS's promises and avoids measures that would explicitly contradict the electoral platform. However, the document suffers from two structural vulnerabilities. The first is selectivity: some central promises are omitted (housing), while others are adopted in a form that dilutes the initial commitment or makes it difficult to verify (doubling incomes, increasing pensions). The second is the lack of an operational level: for many objectives, milestones, intermediate deadlines, instruments, and responsible institutions are not specified, weakening both implementation capacity and the possibility of external monitoring. Under these conditions, in the economic and social dimension, the Programme risks functioning more as a political manifesto than as a measurable government plan, and subsequent evaluation may depend on interpretation rather than faithful fulfilment of the electoral mandate.

CONCLUSIONS

The comparative analysis shows that the Government Programme "EU, Peace, Development" broadly maintains the political direction of the PAS electoral mandate; however, the coherence between campaign promises and the actions planned in the Programme is uneven across sectors and is often stronger at the thematic level than at the level of measurable delivery. In the sectors analysed, most promises are mentioned or partially integrated, but only some are partially translated into operational objectives (with timelines, budgets, mechanisms, and indicators). Two cross-cutting patterns are also observed: (1) the recalibration of promises formulated as final outcomes into process-oriented objectives (which are easier to manage internally but harder to assess publicly), and (2) significant differences in programme "density", with well-structured and quantified chapters (particularly where investments can be supported by external funding) alongside chapters in which commitments remain general or are omitted, especially on politically sensitive or socially costly issues.

Strengths of the Government Programme

1. *Overall strategic coherence and European anchoring.* The Programme is broadly aligned with the National EU Accession Programme 2025–2029, which provides a relatively coherent reform logic and a predictable direction for alignment with the EU acquis. This anchoring reduces the risk of legislative improvisation and creates a common framework for sectoral policies.
2. *Higher degree of realism compared to maximalist electoral promises.* In the areas of European integration and security, the Programme avoids formulations that suggest guaranteed outcomes dependent on external factors (for example, "accession within four years") and instead emphasizes steps that can be controlled at the national level: negotiations, harmonisation, institutional consolidation, and resilience. This prudence reduces the risk of commitments that cannot be honoured.
3. *Better operationalisation in investment- and service-based sectors.* Human rights, education, and healthcare are addressed more concretely, with investments, mechanisms, and in some cases indicators (for example, the expansion of "Model Schools", digitalisation in healthcare, and regional hospitals). In the area of inclusion of persons with disabilities, clearer targets and instruments appear than in the electoral platform.
4. *Going beyond electoral promises in certain areas.* The Programme includes more ambitious interventions than those presented during the campaign in at least three areas:
   - ❏ *Security and defence:* the introduction of the "Capable Defence" pillar extends the agenda beyond diplomacy and reintegration, committing to the modernisation of internal capabilities, resilience, and gradual integration into the European security architecture.
   - ❏ *Exports:* the target of exports reaching "at least 50% of GDP" exceeds in ambition the promise to "double exports" by 2030.
   - ❏ *Road quality:* the commitment to EU standards raises the level beyond the quantitative promise of rehabilitated kilometres, at least in terms of intent.

Weaknesses and Relevant Discrepancies

1. *Reduction of explicit political ambition in European integration.* The Programme retains 2028 but redefines it as a deadline for process milestones rather than as a final political outcome (accession treaty / EU membership status). This is a realistic recalibration, but it diminishes the verifiability of the electoral mandate and risks weakening political accountability for the core campaign promises.
2. *Insufficient operationalisation in key areas of justice.* Although all promises are present, only the vetting process is translated in a relatively concrete manner (including timelines). By contrast, anti-corruption efforts, asset recovery, and reform of access to legal professions remain overly general: steps, responsible actors, resources, and indicators are missing. Here, coherence exists "on paper", but delivery becomes difficult to track and easy to present selectively.

3. *Human rights: uneven coherence and sensitive omissions.*
   - ❏ *Dilution/reframing:* gender-based violence is shifted from a specialised services approach to a security-oriented framing ("safe communities"), without clear commitments regarding shelters, counselling, and dedicated funding.
   - ❏ *Major omission:* the political rights of the diaspora (electronic voting / voting by correspondence) are absent from the Programme, despite having been central campaign promises. The diaspora is treated almost exclusively as an economic and cultural resource.
   - ❏ *Incomplete approach:* freedom of the press is addressed mainly through media literacy and regulation, without clear measures to ensure the economic sustainability of independent media, despite this being the core intent of the electoral promise.
4. *Economic and social block: the largest deviations from promises.*
   - ❏ Promises reformulated through less ambitious objectives, with reduced impact compared to the original electoral commitment: "doubling incomes" is neither reflected as an explicit objective nor supported by targets equivalent to a doubling relative to 2025. In addition, increases are expressed in absolute values, without clear protection of purchasing power under inflation scenarios.
   - ❏ Complete omissions: affordable housing (25,000 housing units, utility infrastructure networks, the National Housing Strategy) and the concrete elements of tax reform (limiting the frequency of changes, a new EU-compliant Tax Code, full digitalisation of controls) are not transposed.
   - ❏ Objectives difficult to achieve (due to resource and implementation capacity constraints): the large-scale rehabilitation of roads and raising quality to EU standards, as well as the target of exports reaching 50% of GDP, are ambitious but lack an implementation architecture (milestones, execution capacity, annual financing, prioritisation).

Realism and Feasibility: Where the Greatest Risks Arise

1. *Dependence on external financing.* The Programme relies on large-scale investments, many of which are plausible only through the EU Growth Plan and other external instruments. By contrast, promises with recurrent budgetary impact (wages, pensions, allowances) are difficult to sustain through external resources and depend on economic growth and fiscal collection. This creates a structural risk: investments may progress, while the income and social protection component remains vulnerable to economic shocks.
2. *Administrative capacity and human resources.* In several areas, delivery depends on institutions capable of designing, implementing, and monitoring complex reforms. Shortages of qualified staff and non-competitive remuneration may translate into delayed deadlines, low absorption rates, and uneven results. This risk is cross-cutting and affects digitalisation, implementation of the acquis, and the management of investment programmes.
3. *Lack of public monitoring benchmarks.* In most areas, the Programme does not establish sufficiently clear indicators, phased roadmaps, institutional responsibilities, or intermediate deadlines. This gap reduces society's ability to track progress and increases the risk that performance will be reported through isolated measures rather than systemic results.

Overall Assessment of Coherence

Overall, the Government Programme is coherent in terms of orientation, but uneven in its fidelity to electoral promises and insufficient as an operational instrument. There are areas in which the Programme delivers more, or in a more concrete manner, than what was stated in the electoral promises (the military pillar, certain inclusion targets, specific investments), but there are also areas where core promises are omitted or diluted (the diaspora, affordable housing, verifiable economic measures, gender-based violence). In areas where ambition is high (exports, roads, defence modernisation), the lack of phasing, explicit multiannual financing, and implementation mechanisms means that the achievement of objectives is likely to be affected by delays and difficult to assess ex post against clear and verifiable criteria.

The main conclusion is that PAS has converted a significant share of its electoral promises into a more cautious and more technical government programme, but this transformation is not uniform. Where external support exists and reforms are of a structural nature (investments, digitalisation, EU alignment), the Programme appears more solid and credible; by contrast, in areas involving costly social interventions, politically sensitive decisions, or complex implementation mechanisms (the diaspora, gender-based violence, media, housing, incomes), coherence with electoral promises is weaker and implementation risks are higher.

DEGREE OF INCORPORATION OF ELECTORAL PROMISES INTO THE GOVERNMENT PROGRAMME

Electoral Promise	Is this promise integrated into the Government Programme? (Yes/No)	Degree of integration of the promise (0–5)	Comment on the degree of integration of electoral promises into the Government Programme
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION			
1. Signing the EU Accession Treaty by 2028, before the end of President Maia Sandu's second mandate. (Objective 1 in the chapter "Five Strategic Objectives" of the PAS 2025 Electoral Programme). How will we achieve this objective? At the diplomatic level, we will maintain excellent relations with the EU and key partners, while continuing to develop friendly relations and cooperation with each Member State. At the technical level, we will maintain absolute priority for alignment with the European legal framework and standards.	**Yes**	3	Programul preia explicit ținta de 2028, dar o plasează la nivelul finalizării negocierilor, nu al semnării tratatului de aderare: „Finalizarea negocierilor... până în anul 2028" . Componenta tehnică a promisiunii (alinierea la acquis și capacitate de implementare) este reflectată prin angajamentul de implementare a Programului Național de Aderare 2025–2029 și „alinierea la acquis", plus accent pe capacități administrative. Lipsesc însă elementele care ar face legătura operațională dintre „negocieri închise" și „tratat semnat" (condiții, pași, calendar intermediar, responsabilități).
2. Accession to the European Union. Within the next four years, the Republic of Moldova will complete the EU accession process and become a full member state of the great European family. We will work to achieve this national strategic objective in order to provide greater security and prosperity for citizens. (*"Major objective" in the chapter "Foreign Policy – Security through Diplomacy" of the PAS 2025 Electoral Programme*)	**Yes**	2	The Programme confirms the direction of accession and frames it as preparation and accelerated integration "even before becoming a member state", with a concrete objective of completing negotiations by 2028. However, the electoral promise referred to becoming a member state within the next four years; the Programme does not explicitly commit to an accession date or to obtaining membership status, but instead describes preparatory steps (NAP 2025–2029, dialogue, strategic communication, capacity-building). The discrepancy between a promised "final result" (membership) and an "intermediate stage" (negotiations and preparation) represents a significant gap and thus a low degree of integration.

JUSTICE			
1. Continuation and completion of the vetting of judges and prosecutors, so that no person with integrity issues holds these positions.	**Yes**	4	The Government Programme explicitly takes over the promise to complete the vetting process and details it more than during the campaign: it sets a deadline (December 2026) and mentions measures to mitigate system impact (filling vacancies, including at the Supreme Court of Justice, and ensuring working conditions). However, vetting alone cannot guarantee that no person with integrity issues will enter or remain in office; this would require additional permanent measures. Moreover, if the list of persons subject to vetting is expanded, the 2026 deadline may become difficult to meet, justifying a score below the maximum.
2. Improving the investigation and adjudication of corruption cases to ensure rapid and fair examination.	**Yes**	2	The Programme almost identically reproduces the promise regarding "rapid and fair" handling of corruption cases, but does not explain how this will be achieved. Minimum measures that would make the objective credible are missing, such as rules for selecting specialised judges and prosecutors and ensuring the necessary resources (including premises for the specialised court and prosecutor's office, where legal obligations already exist). No procedural or legislative changes are indicated to explain how case processing will be accelerated without affecting quality. In this form, the promise remains more an intention than an implementation plan.
3. Comprehensive reform of the legal and institutional framework for the recovery of criminal assets, in order to recover stolen funds more quickly.	**Yes**	3	The Programme includes the objective of asset recovery, but formulates it mainly as an outcome ("accelerating confiscation" and reuse of assets for social/public purposes), without describing the concrete steps of a "comprehensive reform". Legislative or institutional changes, tools to be used, and performance criteria are not clearly specified. At the same time, the Programme goes beyond the electoral promise by including reuse of confiscated assets, an idea also present in the draft law already adopted at first reading by Parliament in 2025. Therefore, the promise is present but largely declarative, lacking an explanation of how the reform will be implemented.

4. Reform of access to the professions of judge/prosecutor in line with EC recommendations; guarantees of stability/predictability; improvement of training at the National Institute of Justice to EU standards.	**Yes**	3	The Programme takes over the promise almost in full. As above, it remains insufficiently detailed in terms of how the promise will be implemented. Specifically, no measures or actions are indicated (for example: development of new admission criteria, evaluation of the INJ's capacity, or identification of responsible institutions). One can only assume what authorities mean by "in line with EC recommendations". Previous recommendations (including those remaining from the 2022 TAIEX evaluation) referred to transparency of admission to the INJ, practical traineeships, human resources strategies, and reform of remuneration to attract and retain qualified candidates and fill vacancies. These concrete elements—especially those related to human resources and salaries—are neither provided nor described in the Programme, leaving the promise at the level of intention.[1]

HUMAN RIGHT

1. "Increasing the minimum pension and social benefits."	**Yes**	3	The promise is present in the Government Programme through the commitment to "continuous increase of pensions" and expansion of the beneficiary base. However, the absence of an explicit numerical target for the minimum pension (in contrast to the minimum wage, set at 10,000 lei) indicates a cautious, process-oriented approach rather than a guaranteed outcome.
2. "Programme to combat domestic and gender-based violence, including the development of a network of shelters and counselling services."	**Yes (Partial)**	2	Integration is minimal and conceptually problematic. The Programme subsumes domestic violence under the chapter "Safe Communities", emphasising public order. Explicit commitments regarding the creation of new shelters or specialised services are missing, ignoring GREVIO recommendations and the spirit of the Istanbul Convention.
3. "Support services for persons with disabilities and their social and professional inclusion."	**Yes**	4	The promise is sufficiently transposed, with quantifiable targets: a 30% increase in beneficiaries of social services and access to adapted education for 80% of children with special educational needs. The Programme addresses inclusion transversally, including entrepreneurship measures and direct financial support.

1. https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/23fa6af0-89b3-4532-a3d9-d1638727d14c_en?filename=moldova-report-2025.pdf

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4. "Ensuring equitable access to quality education for all children, regardless of place of residence."	**Yes**	**5**	The promise is fully transposed and detailed at a higher level of granularity. The Programme provides for major investments (6 billion lei), expansion of the "Model Schools" network to 90 institutions, performance targets (80% pass rate at grade 9), and human capital investment (500 young teachers annually).
5. "Guaranteeing universal access to essential healthcare services, with an emphasis on rural areas."	**Yes**	**4**	The promise is reflected through structural modernisation measures. The Programme provides for accelerating the construction of regional hospitals in Bălți and Cahul, full digitalisation of the system (digital medical record), and population screening programmes. The rural focus is addressed through decentralisation and regional infrastructure.
6. "Protecting press freedom and combating disinformation by supporting independent media."	**Yes**	**3**	The promise is partially reflected. The Programme provides for the "Development and implementation of the Media Development Strategy" and media literacy. However, details on direct financial support mechanisms for independent media, promised electorally, are missing.
7. "Ensuring the unrestricted right to vote for the diaspora through the implementation of electronic or postal voting."	**No**	**0**	The promise of electronic or postal voting is entirely absent from the Government Programme. The Diaspora section is exclusively economic and cultural. Although a limited postal voting pilot took place in 2025, there is no commitment to generalisation.
SECURITY AND DEFENCE			
1. Strengthening security through diplomacy and European integration.	**Yes**	**4**	The promise is well integrated thematically and conceptually into the Government Programme, explicitly reflected in the dedicated chapter "Diplomacy for Peace", which openly recognises the link between foreign policy and national security in a region marked by risks and instability. The Programme clearly defines diplomacy as an instrument for defending national interests, consolidating peace and stability, and correlates this role with deepening relations with the EU and the Euro-Atlantic space, as well as gradual integration into the European security architecture. Integration is solid at the strategic and narrative level, but remains incompletely operationalised: concrete external security priorities, specific European instruments, and indicators linking diplomacy to measurable security and resilience outcomes are missing.

2. Strengthening bilateral strategic partnerships (Romania, Ukraine, EU, Euro-Atlantic space, Central Asia, South-East, Middle East) for economic development and security.	**Yes**	**4**	The promise appears almost in full, including the geographical scope of partnerships, in "Diplomacy for Peace", point 1, which explicitly provides for deepening relations with neighbours, EU states, the Euro-Atlantic space, and priority regions (Central Asia, South-East, Middle East) for economic development and security strengthening, as well as "increased participation in international peacekeeping missions". Integration is strong at the declarative and orientation level, but lacks translation into concrete measures (types of agreements/ formats, sectoral security priorities, institutional capacities, annual deliverables), thus falling short of being "full". Formats (bilateral, NATO PfP, training initiatives, interoperability), domains (air defence, mobility, cyber, logistics), and expected results are not specified. Given hybrid pressures and regional risks related to Transnistria and the war in Ukraine, the lack of detail reduces clarity on how these partnerships will be "strengthened" beyond intent.
3. Increasing multilateral cooperation (UN, Council of Europe, OSCE) to advance national interests, reintegration, investment, and democratic consolidation.	**Yes**	**4**	The promise is directly taken over in "Diplomacy for Peace", point 2: active participation in the UN, Council of Europe, and OSCE, and use of these platforms for national interests, reintegration, investment, and democracy. The Programme does not specify measurable objectives, concrete positioning within organisations, or targeted outcomes (e.g. initiatives, resolutions, priority dossiers, representation capacity), keeping integration at a high, non-operational level.
4. Identifying measures for the gradual and irreversible integration of the Transnistrian region into national single spaces (economic, fiscal, customs, legal, etc.), using the opportunities of European integration.	**Yes**	**4**	The Programme takes over this promise almost in full: it explicitly refers to "gradual convergence in the legal, economic, customs, fiscal, social, informational, and political spaces" and to uniform application of EU-harmonised legislation throughout the entire territory. The link with European integration is clearly articulated, and irreversibility is implicitly supported through legal rigor. However, concrete instruments (stages, conditionalities, control mechanisms, budgetary impact) are missing.

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5. Increasing the attractiveness of peaceful reintegration for the population of the Transnistrian region through educational programmes, public services, and information.	**Yes**	**4**	The Programme directly reflects this promise through commitments to provide "high-quality, non-discriminatory, and accessible" public services across key areas (education, healthcare, energy, documentation, economic activity) and to continue confidence-building projects. The focus on tangible benefits for the population aligns well with human security realities in the region. Integration is strong in logic and direction but remains incomplete operationally: distinct programmes, dedicated budgets, or attractiveness indicators (mobility, enrolments, effective access) are not specified.
6. Involving international partners in supporting a phased and sustainable reintegration plan (EU, USA, Ukraine, Romania, OSCE, UN).	**Yes**	**3**	The Programme explicitly recognises the role of the European Union on the Transnistrian dimension and mentions the use of diplomatic and political instruments to reduce security risks, including transformation of the peacekeeping mission into a civilian one. However, the involvement of international partners is framed more narrowly than in the electoral promise: the emphasis is predominantly on the EU, while references to the USA, Ukraine, Romania, or the UN are indirect. A clear "phased plan" or coordination mechanism for external assistance does not appear, reducing the degree of integration to a medium level.
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT			
1. Doubling the incomes of the active population (private-sector employees, teachers, doctors, police officers, self-employed professionals, and many others). Increasing the minimum wage from 5,500 lei to 10,000 lei; increasing the average wage to at least 25,000 lei by 2030, and ensuring continuous growth of minimum and average pensions.	**Yes**	**2**	The promise appears, but without measures, deadlines, actions, or responsible institutions. Although the Programme provides for increases in both the minimum and average wages, these do not constitute a doubling relative to 2025 values. The values reflected in the Programme for 2029 represent 90% of the doubled minimum wage and 77.6% of the doubled average wage. Growth in the average wage is conditioned on productivity and economic growth. Moreover, the Programme uses absolute values that do not account for inflation and purchasing power. Additionally, it does not explicitly specify the objective of doubling teachers', police officers', or doctors' salaries, as stated in the campaign. Regarding pensions, the Programme does not explain the amounts, annual targets, or sources of growth.

2. Doubling the value of domestically produced goods and services exported worldwide by 2030, by allocating substantial financial resources to support companies seeking international expansion and by building industrial parks and logistics complexes.	**Yes**	**3**	The promise is moderately reflected: partial actions exist, but it is neither full nor strategic. The target included in the Programme is higher than that in the electoral promise. According to the Republic of Moldova's 2024 balance of payments, goods exports amounted to USD 2.56 billion and services exports to USD 2.732 billion. Doubling this value would mean USD 10.584 billion in exports of goods and services. GDP for 2028 is estimated at 440 billion lei, or approximately USD 26.2 billion; 50% of this would amount to USD 13 billion—around USD 3 billion more than the electoral promise target. In 2024, Moldovan exports accounted for around 27.6% of GDP. The Government Programme does not detail the extent to which proposed measures will ensure achievement of this objective, nor intermediate milestones.
3. Up to 3,000 km of additional roads built or repaired by 2029, so that the entire national and regional road network is in good condition.	**Yes**	**3**	The promise is moderately reflected: partial actions exist, but it is neither full nor strategic. The promise is not clearly detailed through measures and intermediate actions. It is unclear what volume of annual financing (from the Road Fund and foreign investments) is required to bring the entire national and regional road network into good condition. According to the 2024 Road Fund execution report, only 31% of national roads are in good or very good condition. Of the 5,993 km of national and regional roads, 4,153 km are in mediocre, poor, or very poor condition and require rehabilitation. This would imply rehabilitating over 1,000 km of roads per year and ensuring proper maintenance to avoid premature degradation. Between 2021 and 2024, the share of roads in mediocre, poor, and very poor condition decreased by only 6.7% (from 76% in 2021 to 69.3% in 2024). At such a pace, it is unclear how the Government intends to increase progress tenfold, especially given that the draft 2026 state budget annexes project a reduction of the Road Fund by approximately 800 million lei compared to 2025.

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4. Increasing access to affordable housing: a. Stimulating, through the private sector, the construction of at least 25,000 housing units over the next four years around the Chişinău urban area (Ialoveni, Străşeni, Anenii Noi, etc.). b. Identifying resources for additional financing of electricity, water, and sewerage networks outside Chişinău to accelerate housing construction. c. Developing and approving a National Housing Strategy with a clear action plan on housing affordability and sustainability.	**No**	**0**	The promise is not reflected in the Government Programme.
5. Greater fiscal stability and simplicity: • adopting fiscal changes no more frequently than once every two years; • adopting a new Tax Code in line with European legislation; • simplifying budget payments; • unifying VAT in agriculture; • combating tax evasion through automation of risk identification processes and full digitalisation of tax controls, etc.	**Yes**	**2**	The promise appears, but without measures, deadlines, actions, or responsible institutions. Predictable fiscal policy is ensured through compliance with the budget calendar and a high level of trust in medium-term budget planning (MTBF). Additionally, fiscal policy measures should be widely consulted, communicated in advance, and implemented at maturity. In this context, the Government Programme should have reflected these aspects rather than remaining at a declarative level. The Programme does not provide for adoption of a Tax Code aligned with European legislation.
6. Leveraging the EU Growth Plan of EUR 1.9 billion and the opportunities offered by EU accession.	**Yes**	**3**	The Programme transposes the electoral promise ad litteram. However, disbursement of funds under the EU Growth Plan is conditional on fulfilling reform commitments included in the 2025–2027 Reform Agenda, approved by Government Decision No. 260/2025. In this context, the Government Programme should have listed actions to ensure fulfilment of reform commitments and disbursement conditionalities. Moreover, even assuming timely disbursement, this does not guarantee absorption. The Republic of Moldova has recorded an extremely slow pace in absorbing funds allocated by international financial institutions for infrastructure projects. This pace will not allow timely utilisation of the EUR 1.9 billion EU Growth Plan. The Programme should have addressed these issues and outlined actions to remove major constraints that risk undermining the effective use of this substantial financial support.

| 7. Supporting local producers through measures to rebalance commercial relations between producers and retailers. | Yes | 4 | The Programme provides measures aimed at supporting local producers in their relations with retailers, including: promotion of agricultural cooperatives and associative forms to reduce production costs and increase farmers' bargaining power; creation of integrated regional centres for collection and processing of agri-food products to strengthen value chains; support for increasing the presence of Moldovan products on domestic shelves; development and modernisation of agricultural markets. Although the electoral promise is transposed through dedicated measures, prioritisation of actions and temporal orientation are missing. |

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FROM ELECTORAL PROMISES TO GOVERNANCE:

HOW WELL ARE COMMITMENTS REFLECTED IN THE GOVERNMENT PROGRAM?

OVERALL INTEGRATION SCORE
The Government Programme incorporates most electoral themes, but only a portion of the promises are translated into clear, measurable, and easily monitorable commitments.

Average overall score:
≈ 3,0

0 1 2 3 4 5

Comparison by Public Policy Areas

SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT	EUROPEAN INTEGRATION	SECURITY AND DEFENCE	JUSTICE	HUMAN RIGHTS
2,4 ★★★★★	**2,5** ★★★★★	**3,8** ★★★★★	**3,0** ★★★★★	**3,0** ★★★★★
Partial integration; key promises remain unassumed or poorly detailed.	The direction is maintained, but ambition is reduced compared to the campaign.	The best-reflected policy area, with strategic coherence.	Thematic consistency, but uneven operationalization.	Progress on social rights, caution on politically sensitive issues.
The program sets out some ambitious targets (exports, roads), but omits or dilutes core promises such as affordable housing and euro-compliant tax reform, limiting clarity of implementation.	Governance focuses on controlled technical steps (negotiations, alignment), implicitly abandoning electoral commitments to sign the accession treaty and obtain EU member state status by 2028.	Commitments on security through diplomacy, strategic partnerships, and peaceful reintegration are taken over almost in full, but remain insufficiently translated into concrete instruments and measurable outcomes.	The reform direction is maintained and vetting is even strengthened; however, the lack of detail on anti-corruption measures and asset recovery limits the assessment of real progress.	Some commitments are exemplary implemented (education, disability rights), while others are diluted or omitted altogether (gender-based violence, press freedom—economic dimension, diaspora voting).

BEST-INTEGRATED PROMISES

Promise	Score	
Equal access to quality education	5 / 5	✅
Inclusion of persons with disabilities	4 / 5	✅
Security through diplomacy and European integration	4 / 5	✅

WEAKLY OR NOT AT ALL INTEGRATED PROMISES

Promise	Score	
Affordable housing	0 / 5	⚠️
Diaspora voting rights	0 / 5	⚠️
Combating domestic violence	2 / 5	⚠️
Doubling the incomes of the active population	2 / 5	⚠️

Independent assessment of the degree to which electoral promises are integrated into the Government Programme (score 0–5). The analysis compares the commitments made during the electoral campaign with the measures, targets, and actions included in the Government Programme.